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ABSTRACT
Kirkland, Rena A. Mental State Understanding During Aging: An Examination of
Cognitively Effortful and Cognitively Efficient Mechanisms. Published Doctor of
Philosophy dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 2013.
The human ability to understand the mental states of others is a fundamental skill
necessary for social interactions. Some researchers have argued that two cognitive
systems underlie mental state understanding; one that is cognitively efficient and another
that is cognitively effortful and partially mediated by explicit processes. The purpose of
the current study was to investigate mental state understanding in older adults (aged 60 to
87) from the framework of examining these two systems. To achieve these goals, the
current study used two tasks that differed in the degree to which they involve implicit
versus explicit processes. A level-1 visual perspective taking task was employed to
examine if older adults showed evidence of automatically processing another individual’s
perspective (in this task, the “other” perspective was a digital avatar displayed on a
computer screen). A dual task was utilized to examine the impact of inhibitory control on
level-1 visual perspective taking. Explicit mental state understanding was examined with
a theory of mind story task. Finally, the digit span and symbol span from the Wechsler’s
Adult Intelligence Scale-IV were used as measures of verbal and spatial working memory
respectively.
Results indicated that older adults (n = 42) were prone to egocentric interference
effects, suggesting that older adults own perspective interferes with taking another
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individual’s perspective. No evidence was found that older adults automatically process
another individual’s perspective; thus, no evidence was found of a cognitively efficient
mechanism for mental state understanding during aging. The dual-task results indicated
that only the self perspective was significantly slower for the dual task compared to the
level-1 visual perspective taking alone.
A hierarchical regression was conducted to examine the degree to which verbal
and spatial working memory mediated theory of mind and level-1 visual perspective
taking performance. Results indicated that verbal but not spatial working memory
contributed to theory of mind performance. Verbal and spatial working memory did not
contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking. This was the first study to examine
cognitively efficient and cognitively effortful mechanisms in mental state understanding
in older adults. The results offer an explanation for previous research that suggests
mental state understanding in older adults declines above what can be explained by
general cognitive decline. Furthermore, the results offer several theoretical contributions
regarding the nature and limits of a cognitively efficient system for mental state
understanding.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The human capacity for mental state understanding far surpasses that of any other
species and is a fundamental cognitive capacity necessary for everyday social interactions
(Saxe, 2006). Mental state understanding is considered to include a wide range of skills,
such as decoding nonverbal behavior, emotion perception, and reasoning about other’s
mental states. The ability to understand the contents of another individual’s mind is of
such vital importance that when this ability is impaired, significant social deficits are
observed (Hughes, Soares-Boucaud, Hochmann, & Frith, 1997). For example, research
has found deficits in mental state understanding are significantly correlated with
difficulties in everyday social interactions in autism spectrum disorders, (Baron-Cohen,
Howlin, & Hill, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, Frith, 1985), schizophrenia (Penn, Corrigan,
Bentall, Racenstein, & Newman, 1997), post-traumatic stress disorder (Schmidt &
Zachariae, 2009), and traumatic brain injuries (Bibby & McDonald, 2005). Conversely,
there is evidence to suggest that individuals who excel in mental state understanding are
more likely to interact with others cooperatively (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). To illustrate
the importance of judging the contents of another individual’s mind, consider the
following situation: yesterday I was struggling with two children and several pieces of
luggage before ascending an escalator at the airport. Realizing someone was behind me,
I glanced back and gauged that the woman was sympathetic regarding my struggles.
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Concluding that the woman was not in a rush nor irritated at my debacle, I continued
ahead of her; however, if I had judged that the woman was irritated and or in a hurry, I
would have stepped aside to let her pass. Despite the continuous stream of complex
cognitive processing involved in a social interaction such as this, the human brain handles
the input and drives behavior with little effort (Beer & Ochsner, 2006).
As illustrated in the example above, successful human interaction depends, in
part, on the ability to understand the intentions, beliefs, and desires of others (Stone,
2005). During aging, impairments in mental state understanding have been well
documented (e.g., Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004) although
the mechanisms underlying the observed deficits are not clearly understood (Moran,
2013). This is in large part due to the complex cognitive processes involved in
understanding other’s mental states. For instance, cognition involved in understanding
other people’s mental states includes processes such as: visual-perception of other agents,
usually conspecifics (Heider & Simmel, 1994); attentional processes (Leslie, Friedman,
& German, 2004); facial expression processing, including eye gaze direction (Langton,
Watt, & Bruce, 2000); emotion processing (Adolphs, 2002), and executive functioning
(Ahmed & Miller, 2011).
The underlying cognitive processes involved in mental state understanding have
been argued to include both cognitively effortful as well as fast and automatic processes
(Frith & Frith, 2008; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Sabbagh, 2004). Theory of mind, the
ability to make mental state inferences in order to predict behavior (Premack &
Woodruff, 1978), involves explicit cognitive processes. For instance, if you were to
predict where I am going to search for my computer, then you would need to consider my

3
belief regarding where my computer is located. Thus, tasks that measure theory of mind
ability require that participant’s explicitly reason about mental states, such as beliefs.
Studies with children and adult samples suggest that theory of mind correlates with
executive functioning (e.g., Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, & Morris, 2001; Sabbagh, Xu,
Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006), working memory (e.g., Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010), and
verbal ability (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Hughes, 1998;
Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007), demonstrating that
individual differences in mental state understanding are partially mediated by cognitively
effortful processes.
Unlike the cognitive resources required for theory of mind tasks, other aspects of
mental state understanding may not involve cognitively effortful processes. One such
capacity is the ability to differentiate between our own perspective and the perspective of
another individual. Research suggests that taking the visual perspective of another
individual is less dependent on executive functioning, memory, and language (Samson,
Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010). Compared to explicit theory of
mind abilities, which emerges between the ages of 3 and 4 along with the burgeoning
cognitive capacities of executive function, working memory and verbal ability, the
capacity for visual perspective taking emerges relatively early (Moll & Tomasello, 2006;
Song & Baillargeon, 2008). For instance, indirect evidence from infant studies suggests
that 14-month olds are capable of taking into account the visual perspective of another
individual (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007). Thus, it has been argued that mental state
understanding also involves cognitively efficient processes in addition to cognitively
effortful resources (Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010). The purpose of the current
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study was to explore mental state understanding during aging utilizing two tasks that vary
in the degree to which they require cognitively effortful versus efficient processes.
Mental State Understanding During Aging
Over the past decade and a half, several studies have investigated if mental state
understanding declines with age (e.g., Bailey & Henry, 2008; Happé, Winner, &
Brownell, 1998). A recent meta-analysis found moderate to large effects in favor of
young compared to older adults on all mental state tasks examined (i.e., tasks utilizing
multiple modalities and a variety of task demands, Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey,
2012); however, research examining mental state understanding in older adults is
complicated by age-related cognitive decline. That is, during aging several cognitive
capacities decline that are related to individual differences in mental state understanding.
Most of the studies examining mental state understanding during aging have used theory
of mind tasks, which are partially mediated by explicit cognitive processes. Since aging
is associated with declines in executive functioning (e.g., Verhaeghen, 2011) and
working memory (e.g., Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005), it is necessary to extricate the degree
to which age-related decline in mental state understanding is influenced by these
cognitive resources (Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm, 2011).
Studies that have used theory of mind story tasks, which involve reading a short
vignette and inferring the mental state of a character, suggest that mental state deficits
during aging are at least partially mediated by age-related cognitive decline (e.g., German
& Hehman, 2006). Studies using less verbally demanding tasks (e.g., cartoon tasks and
static pictures of eyes), however, also report age-related deficits, which may be
influenced by declining cognitive processes, such as working memory (Henry et al.,
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2012). One of the goals of the current study was to investigate the degree to which
working memory mediates mental state understanding during aging. Specifically, I
examined how verbal and spatial working memory contributed to a theory of mind story
task as well as a task that involves cognitively efficient processes.
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking
Level-1 visual perspective taking is demonstrated when a person can visually
track what someone else can and cannot see (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981).
Level-1 visual perspective taking differs from theory of mind tasks in that a participant
needs only to consider the visual viewpoint of another individual and not their mental
state. A series of studies using a level-1 visual perspective task found that children and
adults are prone to interference from inconsistent perspectives (Samson et al.,2010;
Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010). Specifically, Samson et al. (2010) found
that participants demonstrated two types of interference effects: egocentric (i.e.,
participants were slower and more error prone when asked to judge an agent’s
perspective when their own perspective was inconsistent) and altercentric (i.e.,
participants were slower and more error prone when asked to judge self-perspective when
the agent’s perspective was inconsistent). Samson et al. interpreted the altercentric
interference as evidence that participants spontaneously judged the agent’s perspective
even when they were not instructed to do so.
In a study using a dual-task design, Qureshi and colleagues (2010) employed the
level-1 visual perspective taking task with a secondary executive functioning task. The
aim of using the dual-task paradigm was to investigate the role of executive processes on
the primary perspective taking task. Based on the results, the authors concluded that
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level-1 visual perspective taking does not require executive functioning. Collectively, the
results from these studies suggest that information processing for some aspects of mental
state understanding may proceed relatively efficiently (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees &
Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010). To my knowledge, no studies have investigated
level-1 perspective taking in older adults. In contrast to the age-related deficits found in
tasks that have been shown to require explicit cognitive processes (i.e., theory of mind
tasks), level-1 perspective taking may remain relatively intact during aging. This
hypothesis has not yet been explored and was one of the primary goals of the current
study.
Need for the Study
Studies examining mental state understanding during aging have used theory of
mind tasks, which have been shown to involve high-level cognitive processes (e.g.,
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007). Consequently, it is
necessary to examine the degree to which age-associated decline in mental state
understanding is mediated by general cognitive impairments versus a specific impairment
in understanding mental states. The literature to date suggests that mental state
understanding deteriorates during normal aging (Henry et al.,, 2012); however, many
questions remain regarding the cognitive processes mediating the observed decline.
Moreover, researchers have emphasized that future studies should investigate the degree
to which automatic and efficient versus controlled and effortful processes are involved in
various aspects of mental state understanding (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005;
Surtees & Apperly, 2012). Although a variety of instruments have been utilized to
examine mental state understanding during aging, typically, the tasks involve explicit
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cognitive reasoning. Given the robust finding of age-related decline in mental state
understanding, older adults are an ideal sample to investigate the hypothesis that
cognitively efficient processes are involved in level-1 visual perspective taking. In other
words, since aging is associated with declining cognitive processes, an older adult sample
provides a useful test group for examining cognitively efficient processes. If older adults
show evidence of retaining cognitively efficient processes in spite of the cognitive
decline typically associated with aging, then this would provide evidence that efficient
processes are involved in some aspects of mental state understanding.
Research suggests that individual differences in mental state understanding are
associated with social competence such as, solving social problems, communication
skills, and moral reasoning (Couture, Granholm, & Fish, 2011; Dunn, 1996; Liddle &
Nettle, 2006; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Moreover, when individuals
suffer from impairments in mental state understanding their ability to socially interact is
substantially reduced (e.g., Krych-Applebaum et al., 2007; Pollice et al., 2002). During
aging, there is evidence to suggest that theory of mind deficits are related to reduced
participation in social activities (Bailey, Henry, & von Hipple, 2008). Considering that
the ability to make mental state attributions is related to social functioning, and older
adults show moderate to large deficits compared to young adult samples (Henry et al.,
2012), it follows that investigating the mechanisms underlying age-related declines may
have important implications. In a recent review of mental state understanding in aging,
Moran (2013) emphasized that future research should seek to unravel the degree to which
general cognitive resources impact the observed impairments. With the goal of
improving social understanding for older adults, Moran suggested that it is essential to
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know where remediation efforts should be devoted. That is, elucidating which cognitive
processes influence age-related deficits in mental state understanding may have important
implications for improving social skills during aging. Considering the consequences of
suffering a reduced capacity for mental state understanding, I believe it is a worthwhile
endeavor to investigate the underlying cognitive mechanisms of age-related decline
during aging.
Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of the current study was to explore mental state understanding during
aging utilizing two tasks that vary in the degree to which they involve cognitively
efficient versus effortful processes. A dual-task involving level-1 visual perspective
taking and a secondary executive functioning task were used to examine cognitively
efficient processes. A theory of mind story task was used to examine cognitively
effortful processes. The primary objective was to investigate if there is evidence of
cognitively efficient processes in level-1 visual perspective taking in an older adult
sample. To undertake this first goal, a dual task was utilized to examine if older adults
show altercentric interference (i.e., slower and more error prone when asked to judge
one’s own perspective when the other perspective is inconsistent) when concurrently
performing a secondary executive functioning task. To be precise, if older adults show
evidence of calculating the agent’s perspective during dual-task trials, then this would
suggest that cognitively efficient processes are involved in visual perspective taking (i.e.,
a concurrently performed secondary executive function task does not disrupt the
calculation of the agent’s perspective). The secondary goal of the current study was to
examine the contributions of verbal and spatial working memory in a level-1 visual
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perspective taking task as well as a theory of mind story task. Specifically, the current
study investigated the following questions:
QI

Is there evidence of cognitively efficient processes in level-1 visual
perspective taking in an older adult sample?

Q2

In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial
working memory contribute to theory of mind?

Q3

In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working
memory contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking?
Glossary of terms

Age-related general cognitive decline - A suite of mental capacities associated with
decreasing performance during the aging process.
Altercentric effect - Cognitive interference that occurs when knowing the perspective of
another individual hinders making a judgment regarding one’s own perspective (i.e., two
perspectives are inconsistent, which results in an interference effect for the judgment of
self perspective).
Dual task - A neuropsychological measure that includes the combination of two tasks
that must be performed concurrently.
Egocentric effect - Cognitive interference that occurs when self perspective hinders
making a judgment regarding another individual’s perspective (i.e., two perspectives are
inconsistent, which results in an interference effect for the judgment of the other
individual’s perspective).
Executive functioning - Higher order cognitive processes including planning, inhibition
control, and mental flexibility. Some authors consider working memory as a component
process of executive functioning; however, in the current study I am considering working
memory separately. Executive functioning is operationalized in this study by an
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inhibition task in which participants were asked to respond to an auditory presentation of
the words “day” or “night” by responding in the opposite direction of the words. That is,
when participants hear the word “day” the correct response was to press a picture of a
“moon” on a computer mouse; when they hear the word “night” the correct response was
to press a picture of a “sun”.
Level-1 perspective taking - The ability to visually track what another individual can or
cannot see.
Mental state understanding - This term is used broadly to capture the human ability to
perceive, encode, and reason about mental states such as, beliefs, desires, emotions,
intentions, and visual perspectives of others. The cognitive mechanisms involved in
mental state understanding have been argued to include both cognitively efficient (i.e.,
implicit) and effortful (i.e., explicit) processes.
Spatial working memory - The mental capacity for the storage, manipulation, and
processing of spatial information.
Theory of mind - The ability to make mental state inferences in order to predict behavior
Theory of mind story task - A task in which participants read short vignettes including
two or more characters followed by questions that ask the participants to make mental
state inferences regarding the characters in the story. This task has been demonstrated to
involve explicit cognitive processes such as, executive functioning, working memory,
and verbal reasoning.
Working memory - The cognitive capacity that includes the storage, manipulation, and
processing of information; researchers often consider working memory as a component
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(i.e., subprocess) of executive functioning, however, for this study, working memory was
considered separately from executive functioning.
Verbal working memory - The mental capacity for the storage, manipulation, and
processing of verbal information.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Studies examining age-related changes in mental state understanding have
primarily utilized theory of mind tasks, which require a relatively high degree of explicit
cognitive resources. Research using several different types of theory of mind tasks, (e.g.,
stories and videos), suggests that mental state understanding declines during aging;
however, several cognitive capacities decline during aging that are also related to
individual differences in mental state understanding. Given that theory of mind abilities
have been shown to be associated with executive functioning (e.g., Duval, Piolino,
Bejanin, Eustach, & Desgranges, 2011; Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, & Archibald, 2000),
working memory (e.g., Mutter, Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006), and verbal ability (e.g., Dunn &
Brophy, 2005; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007), researchers have investigated if agerelated changes in theory of mind may be due to more general cognitive decline. The
literature up to the present time, however, is unclear regarding the specific role of general
cognitive decline on age-related theory of mind deficits.
Contrary to the explicit cognitive processes involved in theory of mind tasks,
some aspects of mental state understanding have been suggested to include cognitively
efficient processing (Samson, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010). For
example, evidence suggests that level-1 visual perspective taking, which includes being
able to track the visual perspective of another individual (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz,
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2007), may proceed relatively efficiently (Qureshi et al., 2012). Accordingly, some
researchers have argued that a full account of mental state understanding includes both
cognitively effortful and cognitively efficient processes (Frith & Frith, 2008). In line
with the evidence that some aspects of mental state understanding operates efficiently
while explicit mental state understanding involves cognitively demanding processes,
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) proposed that two systems underlie mental state
understanding. In their model, one system is characterized as implicit and includes
automatic processes. Apperly and Butterfill propose that a second system, which
operates in parallel with the implicit system, is more flexible and requires explicit
processing. Therefore, the two systems are considered to involve cognitively efficient
and cognitively effortful processes respectively.
The inclusion of automatic and controlled processes in social cognition has been
discussed in a wide range of social psychological topics (Chaiken & Trope, 1999;
Lieberman, 2007; Smith & DeCoster, 1999). Several authors have specifically proposed
that mental state understanding is driven by two systems (Leslie, German, & Polizzi,
2005; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Tager-Flushberg & Sullivaan, 2000). The dual route as
conceptualized by Apperly and Butterfill (2009) offers several specific theoretical points.
First, the cognitively efficient system comes at a price of being inflexible whereas the
effortful system is flexible and can process complex information. Second, Apperly (2010,
2013) argues that the cognitively efficient system must be constrained by limits and
understanding the nature of these limits will be useful for advancing the dual route model.
Third, this framework accommodates evidence that suggests infants are capable of
implicit false belief understanding (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, &
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Sperber, 2007) even though children do not pass explicit false belief tasks until between
the ages of three or four years old (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). In a false belief
paradigm (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) children observe an object being hidden in a
location, which is also observed by another character. Subsequently, the character leaves
the room and the object is moved to a different location. To pass a false belief task, a
child must explicitly demonstrate (i.e., give a verbal response) that the character holds a
false-belief and that the false belief will motivate their behavior (e.g., where they will
look for a toy, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). After
decades of research utilizing many variants of the false belief paradigm, researchers agree
that children cannot pass this explicit false belief task until after the age of three (.g.,
Astington & Jenkins, 1999). However, using indirect measures (e.g., looking time),
researchers have found evidence that infants obtain implicit awareness of false-beliefs
(e.g., Clements & Perner, 1994; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007). Apperly and
Butterfill’s (2009) two-system framework provides a theoretical account for these
seemingly contradictory bodies of literature. To date, no studies have investigated
cognitively efficient mechanisms in mental state understanding in older adults. In light of
the robust findings of age-related cognitive decline, it would be valuable to examine if
there is evidence of cognitively efficient processes involved in mental state understanding
during aging.
With the goal of examining the underlying cognitive processes of mental state
understanding during aging, the current study used two tasks that differed in the degree to
which they involve explicit cognitively mediated processes versus efficient processes.
Namely, in addition to a theory of mind task, which requires cognitively effortful
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processes, a level-1 visual perspective taking task was used to investigate efficient
processes. Thus, as outlined in the previous chapter, the goal of the current study was
two fold. First, to examine older adult performance on a level-1 visual perspective taking
task with the purpose of investigating cognitively efficient processes in mental state
understanding during aging. Additionally, to examine how verbal and spatial working
memory contributes to the performance of these two tasks in an older adult sample.
The following literature review is organized into three broad sections for the
following purposes: First, to provide a brief review of cognitive aging literature relevant
to the current study. Second, offer an assessment of the literature to date examining
mental state understanding during aging. Third, to present a description of the methods,
results, and conclusions of three studies that used a level-1 visual perspective taking task.
Ultimately, the goal of the current chapter is to draw together the research investigating
mental state understanding in older adults as well as to present evidence that suggests
some aspects of mental state understanding involve cognitive processes that proceed
relatively efficiently. Finally, the current chapter will conclude with a summary and the
hypotheses for the current study.
Cognitive Aging Related to Mental State Understanding
A substantial amount of research suggests that executive functioning (e.g.,
Hughes, 1998; Perner & Lang, 1999; Perner & Lang, 2000) and working memory
capacity (Davis & Pratt, 1995; Hughes, 1998; Keenan, Olson, & Marini, 1998; Keenan,
1998) impacts the ability of preschool children being able to pass a false belief task
independent of age and other abilities. For instance, a meta-analysis examining the
relation between children’s performance on executive functioning and false belief

16
understanding found a mean correlation coefficient of 1.08, indicating a strong effect for
the relation between these abilities (Perner & Lang, 2000). In addition, several studies
have found that individual differences in false belief performance are related to executive
functioning (e.g., Bora, Eryavuz, Kayahan, Sungu, & Veznedaroglu, 2006; Bora,
Sehitoglu, Aslier, Atabay, & Veznedaroglu, 2007) and working memory abilities (Lin et
al., 2010) in young adult samples. Since normal aging is associated with declining
mental capacities in several cognitive domains (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004), researchers
examining mental state understanding during aging must take into consideration agerelated cognitive decline.
Normal Aging
Normal aging involves cognitive decline that is not considered to be associated
with impairment of daily functioning (Salthouse, 2010). In contrast to normal aging,
dementia is a set of global cognitive symptoms associated with significant dysfunction
(McHugh & Folstein, 1977). Research suggests that for individuals 65 years old the
prevalence of dementia is 4%, with rates doubling approximately every 5-6 years
thereafter; thus, approximately 15% of all 80 year olds have some form of dementia
(Prince et al., 2013). The purpose of the current study is to investigate mental state
understanding during normal aging; therefore, the literature review that follows does not
consider cognitive decline associated with dementia.
Despite the observed variability among individuals (Hultsch, MacDonald, &
Dixon, 2002; Salthouse, 2010) and functions (Schaie, 2005), healthy aging is associated
with cognitive decline after the age of 60 (Schaie, 1996; 2005). Accordingly, most of the
studies examining older adult performance on mental state understanding tasks have
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included adults over 60 years old (e.g., German & Hehman, 2006). Three domains of
cognitive aging are particularly relevant to the literature investigating mental state
understanding during aging: processing speed, executive functioning, and working
memory. The purpose of the following section is twofold: (a) to review three areas of
cognitive aging relevant to mental state understanding; and (b) to outline areas of
cognitive decline that could specifically impact the tasks in the current study.
Aging and Processing Speed
One of the most robust findings in the cognitive aging literature is that mental
processing speed (i.e., speed of information processing) slows during the aging process
(Bashore, 1989; Salthouse, 1985, 1996; Verhaegen & Cerella, 2008). While there are a
variety of methods used to measure processing speed, reaction time is one of the most
frequently used in cognitive aging studies (Chen & Li, 2008). Using reaction time as a
dependent variable, slowed mental processing is indicated by slower reaction times on a
variety of tasks for older compared to young adults. For example, many cognitive aging
studies examine young compared to older adult’s reaction times on simple reaction time
tasks (e.g., Earles & Salthouse, 1995). Specifically, a visual stimulus is presented and
participants must respond with a button press on a computer as soon as they see the
stimulus. Another commonly used task in older adult studies are choice reaction time
tasks. Participants are required to make a selection from two or more different choices of
stimuli as quickly as possible, which are presented randomly (e.g., Der & Deary, 2006).
In addition to reaction time as a measure of processing speed, researchers also use
reaction time as a dependent variable to examine attention (Tse, Balota, Yap, Duchek, &
McCabe, 2010), perception (Ben-David & Schneider, 2009), language processing (Caza
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& Moscovitch, 2005), memory (Kumar, Rakitin, Nambisan, Habeck, & Stern, 2008), and
executive functioning (Chen & Li, 2008). For instance, an in-depth analysis of reaction
time distributions was used to investigate attention in older adults (Tse et al., 2010). In
particular, cognitive researchers often use reaction time as a dependent measure for
experimental designs where independent variables are manipulated and the effects of the
various conditions are investigated by way of examining differential response times for
the conditions (Deary, Liewald, & Nissan, 2011).
A common finding in reaction time studies is that older adult samples demonstrate
greater reaction time variance compared to young adult samples. Often, the standard
deviation in older adults has been reported to be 1.5 times greater compared to young
adults (Ratcliff, Spieler, & McKoon, 2000). In addition to the larger variability across
individuals, there is also greater within person inconsistency compared to younger adult
samples (Fozard, Vercruyssen, Reynolds, Hancock, & Quilter, 1994; Williams, Strauss,
Hultsch, & Hunter, 2007; Anstey, 1999; Hultsch et al., 2002). The degree to which older
adults demonstrate inconsistent performance has been shown to depend on the type of
task (West, Murphy, Armilio, Craik, & Stuss, 2002) and the relative speed of individuals.
Williams, Hultsch, Strauss, Hunter, and Tannock (2005) found that older adults with fast
reaction times were more consistent compared to those individuals falling in the right
hand tail of the distribution. Overall, moment-to-moment inconsistency is observed to be
greatest in individuals with the slowest reaction times. Even though variability both
between and within individuals tends to increase with age (Hultsch, MacDonald, &
Dixon, 2002), studies using reaction time continue to be a common approach to
investigate research questions using a variety of tasks in aging samples.
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Although reaction latencies are overall slower in older compared to younger
adults, some domains show differential age-related slowing (Cerella, 1985; Verhaegen, &
Cerella, 2008). For instance, using meta-analytic techniques, Lima, Hale, and Myerson
(1991) found that older adults demonstrate less slowing than younger adults in tasks
using verbal compared to nonverbal stimuli. That is, while reaction time using both
verbal and nonverbal stimuli decline across age, older adults perform significantly slower
on nonverbal tasks (i.e., nonlexical tasks) compared to verbal tasks (i.e., lexical tasks). In
particular, processing speed has been found to be especially impaired in older adults on
tasks involving spatial information (e.g., Tomer & Cunningham, 1993; Babcock, Laguna,
& Roesch, 1997). Even though evidence suggests that age-related slowing in processing
speed varies based on the type of domain (e.g., lexical, spatial, arithmetic, perceptual),
evidence overwhelmingly suggests that cognitive slowing occurs across all tasks with age
(Bashore, van der Molen, Ridderinkhof, & Wylie, 1997; Madden, 1989; Myerson,
Wagstaff, & Hale, 1994; Perfect, 1994; Schultz, 1994).
Aging and Executive Functioning
Many researchers consider executive functioning to include a suite of high-level
cognitive processes consisting of inhibition control, planning, and mental flexibility
(Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, & Chen, 2008; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, &
Howerter, 2000; Suchy, 2009); however, researchers are not in complete agreement
regarding how executive functioning should be defined and measured (Alvarez & Emory,
2006; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Miyake, Emerson, & Friedman, 2000; Welsh, 2002).
Since cognitive aging researchers suffer the challenge of agreeing upon how executive
functioning should be operationalized, there is wide disagreement regarding which tasks
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best conceptualize executive function decline in older adults. Furthermore, fundamental
questions are debated (Daniels, Toth, & Jacoby, 2006) such as whether or not ageassociated deficits in executive functioning can be explained by one central ability that
declines during aging or, alternatively, if distinct executive components such as,
inhibition control versus task shifting, are differentially impaired (Miyake, Friedman,
Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). Nonetheless, overall there is substantial evidence
that older adults perform worse than younger adults on executive functioning tasks, in
particular for inhibition and mental flexibility (e.g., DiGirolamo et al., 2001; Kramer,
Hahn, & Gopher, 1999; Wecker, Kramer, Wisniewski, Delis, & Kaplan, 2000). While
acknowledging that the debate is far from settled regarding whether age-related executive
functioning decline should be considered through a unified or component specific lens
(Daniels, Toth, & Jacoby, 2006), evidence suggests that executive functioning decline
begins as early as the third decade (Salthouse, 2009a).
A recent meta-analytic investigation of aging and executive function examined
three aspects of executive control: (a) inhibition control (i.e., resistance to interference);
(b) coordinative ability; and (c) task shifting (Verhaeghen, 2011). The ability to
coordinate was assessed through studies using dual-task designs, which showed a small
but reliable age effect (Verhaeghen, Steitz, Sliwinski, & Cerella, 2003; Verhaeghen &
Cerella, 2002). The most reliable decline was found for coordinative ability and task
shifting (i.e., divided attention and the maintenance of two different mental task sets).
One of the tasks that I used in the current study utilized a dual-task design, thus, the
evidence that coordinative ability and task shifting shows reliable age-related decline is
particularly relevant to the current study.
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One aspect that typically is agreed upon is that executive functioning consists of
effortful processes that guide behavior (Banich, 2009). Since I am interested in
examining cognitively effortful versus efficient mechanisms in mental state
understanding, the evidence of age-related decline in executive functioning has important
implications for the current study. Namely, I used a dual task; previous research suggests
that compared to young adults, older adults suffer disproportionate dual task
impairments. The implications of the dual task on older adult performance for the current
study are considered later in this chapter.
Aging and Working Memory
A substantial amount of research suggests that measures of working memory (i.e.,
the storage, manipulation, and processing of information, (Baddeley, 1986; Miller,
Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) decline across the lifespan and that various components of
working memory show differential decline (e.g., Jenkins, Myerson, Joerding, & Hale,
2000). Myerson, Emery, White and Hale (2003) conducted a cross-sectional analysis of
the normative data from the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III) and found evidence of
differential decline between tasks. A negative linear slope was found for both spatial and
digit span scores with the former demonstrating significantly more decline than the latter;
whereas, a curvilinear pattern was found for number sequencing. The authors concluded
that these patterns are suggestive of at least two possible mechanisms involved in agerelated memory changes. Specifically, the linear decline maybe associated with
mechanisms related to the storage of information, whereas the curvilinear decline maybe
associated with mechanisms related to executive control aspects of working memory (i.e.,
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both storage and processing), which decrease disproportionately with age (Myerson et al.,
2003).
Collectively, evidence suggests that complex span tasks, which require
maintenance and processing, show greater age decline compared to simple span tasks,
which requires maintenance only. For instance, Wingfield, Stine, Lahar, and Aberdeen,
(1988) held the type of memory items consistent when comparing complex versus simple
span task performance; results indicated an age-related deficit for complex but not simple
span tasks. A meta-analysis found simple span tasks demonstrated moderate age-related
decline (forward digit span, d= -.53) whereas, complex span tasks demonstrated large
age-related declines (d= -1.01 and -1.54, sentence span and listening span, respectively,
Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005).
Thus far, I have reviewed three domains of age-related cognitive decline that have
been found to be associated with performance declines in mental state understanding
during aging: processing speed, executive functioning, and working memory. One of my
primary goals in the section that follows is to explore the degree to which these cognitive
processes may mediate the performance of mental state understanding in older adult
samples.
Mental State Understanding in Older Adults
The studies to date examining mental state understanding during aging have
primarily used theory of mind tasks, which, in varying degrees, involve explicit cognitive
processes. For instance, several studies have used theory of mind story tasks in which
participants read a vignette of two characters interacting and are asked to make an
inference regarding one of the character’s mental states (e.g., Maylor, Moulson, Muncer,
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& Taylor, 2002). Another example involves second order theory of mind tasks, which
assess recursive reasoning about embedded mental states. That is, a second order task
requires that participants make inferences about a person’s mental state about another
individual’s mental state (e.g., what Al thinks Susan thinks). Although the first study
examining older adult theory of mind abilities did not find evidence of age-related
decline (Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998), subsequent studies suggest that theory of
mind performance does decline with advancing ages (e.g., Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007;
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). When reviewing the literature it is important to consider that
the reduced performance of older adults relative to young adults may be due to agerelated deficits in processing speed, executive function, and working memory that I
reviewed in the first section of the current chapter. Several studies (e.g., German &
Hehman, 2006) have investigated this hypothesis; however, the evidence thus far, is
somewhat mixed. That is, there is evidence to suggest that some theory of mind deficits
are mediated by processing speed, executive functioning, and/or working memory (e.g.,
Phillips, Bull, Allen, Insch, Burr, & Ogg, 2011). There is also evidence to suggest that
during aging, impairments in theory of mind tasks are independent of cognitive domains
(e.g., Maylor et al., 2002).
The evidence that supports the latter hypothesis indicating theory of mind
impairments cannot be fully explained by general cognitive decline corroborates with
research suggesting a specific cognitive network is related to social functioning. The
evidence that supports a neurocognitive architecture specific for social cognition comes
primarily from two areas of research; one from patients with damage to the frontal lobes
(e.g., Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998) and amygdala (e.g., Adolphs, Baron-Cohen,
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& Tranel, 2002) and the other from the literature investigating autism spectrum disorders
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Frith, 2001). Both of these lines of research
point to modularity in social cognition due to intact cognitive processes in the face of
moderate to severe impairments in social functioning (Adolphs, 2002). This is not to say
that age-related cognitive decline, especially in regards to executive functioning, does not
negatively impact performance on mental state tasks. In fact, there is substantial
evidence to suggest that age-related executive functioning impairment mediates mental
state understanding decline in older adults. In the section that follows, I review the
evidence that supports this hypothesis and conclude with my assessment of the evidence
to date.
Mental State Understanding and
General Cognitive Decline
Apperly (2011) suggested that the role of executive processes might
disproportionally impact older adults performance on explicit mental state understanding
tasks. Indeed, evidence from several studies using a variety of tasks supports this
assertion (Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustach, & Desgranges, 2011; Saltzman et al., 2000;
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007). German and Hehman
(2006) examined the performance of young and old adults on four theory of mind stories
that were developed with the intention of systematically increasing the executive
demands of each story. Two of the stories required either true-belief or false-belief
reasoning; previous research suggests that false-belief reasoning requires greater
inhibition control compared to true-belief reasoning (Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005;
Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). The other two stories differed in terms of approach-desire or
avoid-desire, with the latter requiring more executive resources compared to the former
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(Cassidy, 1998). Performance declines were found for both young and older adults as the
executive demands increased; however, older adults performed disproportionately worse
compared to younger adults on the stories that have been purported to involve higher
executive functioning demands.
Similar to findings with developmental samples, one component of executive
functioning that has been implicated to impact theory of mind performance in older
adults is inhibition control (German & Hehman, 2006). Bailey and Henry (2008) found
that older adult performance on theory of mind tasks with high-inhibition demands
showed significantly greater decline compared to theory of mind tasks with lowinhibition demands. Furthermore, a measure of cognitive inhibition (i.e., Stroop task)
mediated theory of mind performance but measures of memory, mental flexibility, and
processing speed did not. A series of hierarchical regression analyses conducted by
German and Hehman (2006) indicated that older adult performance on the theory of mind
story task was most strongly explained by processing speed and inhibitory control
(measured by Stroop and Hayling’s sentence completion). When reaction time was used
as the dependent variable, inhibition was most strongly associated with theory of mind
performance, whereas, speed of processing predicted the most variance in accuracy.
Charlton, Barrick, Markus, and Morris (2009) measured older adult performance
on the Strange Story Task (SST, participants read a short vignette involving a character’s
mental state followed by a question regarding the mental state inference, Happé, 1994;
Happé et al., 1998). In addition, eight tasks tapping various cognitive functions were
administered (Digit Span Backward, Letter-Number Sequencing, Trail Making, Towers,
Wisconsin Card Sorting, letter fluency, category fluency, and Stroop). SST performance

26
correlated with all neuropsychological tasks except for Towers and Letter-Number
Sequencing. The Letter-Number Sequencing is considered a working memory task.
Therefore, in this study older adult working memory performance did not correlate with
SST; however, measures of inhibition control did. Furthermore, the authors conducted a
mediation analysis (McKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007), which indicated that the
relation between age and theory of mind decline was fully mediated by executive
function, information processing speed, and performance intelligence and partially
mediated by verbal intelligence.
There is also evidence that decline in mental state reasoning is partially mediated
by working memory declines (Maylor et al., 2002; Phillips et al., 2011). For instance,
several studies did not find any age effects on first-order theory of mind tasks (i.e.,
inferences about one character’s mental states) but found that older adults performed
worse than young adults on second-order theory of mind tasks (i.e., inferences about one
person’s mental state about another individual’s mental state, Maylor et al., 2002;
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). Since second order theory of mind tasks impose a
higher working memory load compared to first order tasks, these findings suggest that as
working memory demands increase, older adults perform worse than young adults. In
one study that found age-associated deficits on second order but not first order theory of
mind story tasks, the authors analyzed the older adult error rates (McKinnon &
Moscovitch, 2007). Results indicated that almost 70% of the errors were due to their
failure of considering multiple pieces of information or differing information of two
different characters in the stories.
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Sullivan and Ruffman (2004) found that older adults (m= 73 years) performed
worse than younger adults (m= 30 years) on a theory of mind story task; however, there
was no longer a significant age effect when fluid intelligence (i.e., reasoning and problem
solving skills, Cattell, 1963) was accounted for. Sullivan and Ruffman (2004) measured
fluid intelligence with AH4 (Heim, 1970), which includes arithmetic, synonyms, verbal
opposites, and analogies. Of note, several latent variable studies have found that working
memory is closely associated with fluid intelligence (Conway, Cowan, Bunting,
Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). That is,
working memory has been shown to be the best predictor of fluid intelligence compared
to other cognitive variables such as processing speed and short-term memory (Kane,
Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). Thus, it is possible that working memory capacity
partially mediated the relationship between fluid intelligence and theory of mind ability
in this study.
The findings that executive functioning, particularly inhibition, and working
memory partially mediates theory of mind performance in older adults are not surprising
given the evidence that performance on theory of mind tasks are influenced by executive
processes in children and young adult samples (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). Of
course, even young adults show reduced performance on theory of mind tasks as
executive processing demands increase (Lin et al., 2010; McKinnon & Moscovitch,
2007); however, since older adults perform worse on executive functioning tasks
compared to young adult samples, one would expect that older adults would be
disproportionally affected. Indeed, as reviewed earlier, results from several studies
indicate that older adults perform disproportionally worse than young adults on mental
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state tasks as executive demands increase (e.g., German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon &
Moscovitch, 2007).
Collectively, there is substantial evidence to suggest that age-related decline in
mental state understanding is associated with general cognitive impairments. Based on
my analysis of the literature, and in line with Kemp, Després, Sellal, and Dufour’s (2012)
review, the accumulation of research suggests that age-related deficits in making mental
state attributions are at least partially mediated by processing speed, inhibitory control,
and working memory decline. For instance, studies suggest that impairments increase
disproportionately for older adults as secondary executive functioning task demands
increase (e.g., McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Riby, Perfect, & Stollery, 2004;
Verhaeghen, Steitz, Sliwinski, & Cerella, 2003). Furthermore, the findings that agerelated deficits on second order but not first order theory of mind tasks suggests that older
adults display impairments only as executive demands increase (Maylor et al., 2002;
McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). In agreement with my analysis, Moran (2013)
substantiated in his review that executive functioning and fluid intelligence, which he
defines as including working memory and processing speed, explains some of the theory
of mind impairments observed with age.
To date, the age-related decline in mental state understanding has been
demonstrated through theory of mind measures, which require explicit cognitive
resources (Henry et al.,, 2012). Given the strong evidence in support of age-related
decline in theory of mind tasks, it is of interest to examine if some aspects of mental state
understanding are preserved during the aging process. A candidate process that has been
argued to involve cognitively efficient mechanisms is level-1 visual perspective taking
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(Qureshi et al., 2010). The purpose of the next section is to consider level-1 visual
perspective taking that has been suggested to involve cognitively efficient processes
related mental state understanding. In the section that follows, a series of studies are
reviewed that investigated level-1 visual perspective taking in young adults and children.
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking
Evidence of a Cognitively Efficient
System in Perspective Taking
Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Bodley Scott (2010) were interested
in investigating if adults automatically process another persons’ perspective in certain
situations. In an experimental research design, participants made quick judgments on a
level-1 perspective taking task. Participants viewed a picture of a room with an agent
(i.e., computer-generated graphic of a person) standing facing a wall with red dots
displayed on the walls. In some conditions, the agent could “see” the same number of
red dots as the participant. In other conditions, the red dots were behind the agent and
thus, the number of dots the agent and the participant could see did not match (Figure 1).

Figure 1 A

Figure 1 B

Figure. 1. Examples of Stimuli Presented in Samson et al. (2010). A) Participants and
the agent had the same perspective of the dots (consistent conditions); B) Participants
saw a different number of dots than the agent (inconsistent conditions).
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After each trial, participants were asked to judge either, (a) how many dots they
could see (self perspective), or (b) how many dots the agent could see (other perspective).
In the first experiment, trials asking participants to judge either self or other perspectives
were presented in random order within the same block. The second experiment separated
the type of questions being asked of the participants (i.e., self or the agent’s perspective)
into distinct blocks; that is, one block only asked participants to judge one’s own
perspective and a separate block only asked participants to judge the agent’s perspective.
In the third experiment, participants completed blocks with only self perspective trials
(i.e., they never judged the agent’s perspective). Additionally, the third experiment
added a control condition in which a rectangle-distractor (i.e., nonsocial condition) was
used in place of the computer-generated figure (i.e., social condition).
As predicted, egocentric interference effects were found; that is, participants were
slower and more error prone in inconsistent compared to consistent conditions when they
were asked to judge the agent’s perspective. The surprising finding was that when
participants were asked to judge their own perspective they were slower and more error
prone in inconsistent compared to consistent conditions. This indicated that participants
did not ignore the agent’s perspective when being asked to judge how many dots they
could see. Particularly noteworthy, these altercentric effects were also found in the
second and third experiments indicating participants calculated the agent’s perspective
even under conditions when they were never asked to do so. No altercentric effects were
found for the nonsocial condition (i.e., the rectangle), which indicated that the
interference effects found in the social conditions were not likely due to the configuration
of the space but instead were associated with intrusions from the agent’s perspective.
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The egocentric bias found in Samson et al. is in accord with other research
suggesting egocentric biases (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2007; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, &
Gilovich, 2004; Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs, & Nye, 1996), which impacts judgments
regarding someone else’s perspective when it is different from our own. The novel
finding in this study was the evidence that participants are also prone to altercentric
biases, which impacts their subsequent judgments of what they can see (i.e., participants
are slower and make more errors when the agent’s perspective differs from their own).
This was the case even when participants were only instructed to answer what they could
see. The altercentric effect suggests that even when there was no reason for participants
to judge the agent’s perspective, which was the case in the third experiment, participants
still spontaneously processed the agent’s perspective.
Previous research suggests that cognitively effortful processes are necessary to
overcome egocentric biases (Epley & Gilovich, 2004; Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar,
2004; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998; Nickerson, 1999). When considering the results
from Samson et al. in addition to previous findings, it seems plausible that adjusting away
from both egocentric and altercentric biases is cognitively effortful. The largest effect
found in Samson et al.’s study was for egocentric biases, suggesting that making
judgments regarding someone else’s perspective when it is different from our own
requires more cognitive effort compared to when making judgments regarding one’s own
perspective when it is different from another. That is, this finding suggests that an
egocentric bias requires more effort to inhibit compared to an altercentric bias. In sum,
Samson et al.’s (2010) results provided two important pieces of evidence. First, this was
the first study to find an altercentric effect, which suggests that adults process at least
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some aspects of other peoples’ perspective automatically. Additionally, results indicated
that in order to perform less egocentrically and altercentrically on perspective taking
tasks, cognitive resources are recruited in order to inhibit the automatic processing.
These conclusions are strengthened by the following two studies.
Surtees and Apperly (2012) found both egocentric and altercentric effects using a
similar visual-1 perspective taking task in a sample of children (6-10 years old) and
adults. In this study, the social condition used an agent depicted by a cartoon figure and
the nonsocial conditions used yellow and blue rectangular-shaped sticks in replace of the
agent. Also, instead of reading sentences, the participants heard the instructions as to
which perspective to judge. Although adults performed better overall than the children
(i.e., faster), the size of the interference effects were the same for both children and adults.
That is, both samples demonstrated significantly slower reaction times for inconsistent
compared to consistent trials when judging the other perspective (i.e., egocentric effect)
as well as their own perspectives (i.e., altercentric effect). This was the first study that
used the same perspective taking task for both children and adult samples. Even though
adults performed overall better, the adults demonstrated the same interference effects as
the children. These results suggest that dealing with inconsistent perspectives is
cognitively effortful in development as well as adulthood. Additionally, results indicted
that compared to the social condition the nonsocial condition did not reveal an
altercentric effect signifying that participants only spontaneously judged the other
perspective when the stimuli were social in nature. This finding suggests that the
altercentric interference is a result of participants engaging in perspective taking versus a
consequence of the spatial configuration of the task.
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Qureshi, Apperly, and Samson (2010) suggested that the level-1 perspective task
includes calculation and selection. That is, participants are calculating both their own
perspective in addition to the agent’s perspective and then subsequently selecting the
relevant perspective (i.e., the agent’s or self) based on the given probe. Based on this
analysis, Qureshi and colleagues noted that if executive functioning resources are
necessary for this task, then it is unclear if they are involved in calculation, selection, or
both. Qureshi et al. (2010) devised the first study to investigate whether executive
function resources are specifically involved in selection but not calculation.
Using a dual-task design, Qureshi et al. (2010) had participants perform an
executive function task (i.e., Luria’s tapping task) in conjunction with the same level-1
perspective-taking task as in Samson et al. (2010). Luria’s tapping task (Luria, 1966)
requires that participants listen to a recording of one or two tones and respond in
opposition to what they heard (i.e., one key press if they heard two tones and vice versa).
This inhibition task was used with the goal of examining the impact of executive
functioning on selection and calculation processes with the following reasoning:
(a) In regards to calculation, if executive functioning processes are required to
calculate the agent’s perspective when it is irrelevant to the task (such as in the case when
self perspective is required in inconsistent trials), then the secondary task should interrupt
this calculation, therefore reducing altercentric effects.
(b) In regards to selection, if executive functioning is required for selection of
perspectives in level-1 perspective taking (i.e., the primary task), then the dual-task trials
(i.e. with the secondary executive functioning task), should result in a greater processing
costs for both consistent and inconsistent trials but should disproportionately affect the
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inconsistent trials. This reasoning is based on evidence from Samson et al., which found
participants made more errors and were slower when perspectives were inconsistent
compared to consistent. See Table 1 for a summary of the predictions made by Qureshi
et al. regarding the effects of the executive functioning task on calculation and selection
during the perspective taking task.
Table 1
Qureshi et al.’s Predictions for the Effects of the Dual Task
Role of executive function
Calculation

Selection

Self judgments

Decreased altercentric interference

Increased altercentric interference

Other judgments

*

Increased egocentric interference

Note. * Qureshi et al. did not discuss a hypothesis in their article for the effects of
executive functioning for the conditions of Other judgments.

Results indicated that the dual-task trials resulted in larger processing costs
compared to alone trials for both consistent and inconsistent perspectives; however, the
dual-task trials produced disproportionately larger processing cost for the inconsistent
conditions. Thus, the second hypothesis was supported (i.e., dual-task trials resulted in
larger processing costs compared to alone trials), leading Qureshi et al. to conclude that
executive functioning is required for selecting between the two perspectives. In other
words, the secondary executive functioning task slowed participants to a greater extent
when the perspectives were inconsistent due to the reduction of executive processes
available when having to make a selection.
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In contrast, the first hypothesis was not supported with results indicating a larger
altercentric effect in dual task compared to alone trials (i.e., participants were slower and
more error prone when judging their own perspective when the agent’s perspective was
inconsistent with their own). Therefore, the authors concluded that executive functioning
is not required for calculation of the two perspectives. This conclusion rests on the
assumption that if executive functioning was necessary for participants to calculate the
other perspective when being asked to judge their own perspective, then the secondary
executive task (i.e., dual-task trials) would have reduced the cognitive resources available,
and thus, participants would be faster when judging their own perspective because they
are no longer calculating the agent’s perspective. Instead, results suggest that participants
continued to calculate the agent’s perspective even when engaged in a secondary
executive task. The finding of a larger altercentric effect in the dual-task trials is
particularly noteworthy because this suggests that calculation of perspective is automatic.
That is, for inconsistent trials when participants were asked for one’s own perspective,
participants calculated the agent’s perspective even when performing a concurrent
executive functioning task and there was no reason for the participant to do so.
Qureshi et al. is the first study to investigate sub-processes involved in level-1
visual perspective taking. The results suggest that executive functioning capacities may
be necessary for selection and not calculation. It is important to note that the secondary
executive task used in dual-task trials involve reaction inhibition and thus, this study
points to the role of inhibition during selection processes. That is, these results suggest
that inhibition resources constrain selection but not calculation processes involved in
level-1 visual perspective taking.
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To summarize, these studies provided four important pieces of evidence. First,
the altercentric interference suggests that participants automatically calculated the agent’s
perspective even when it was not relevant to the task. Second, these findings suggest that
in order to perform less egocentrically and altercentrically on perspective taking tasks,
cognitive resources are recruited in order to inhibit more automatic processing. Third,
the results that both children and adults revealed the same interference effects suggest
that the underlying cognitive processes involved in level-1 visual perspective taking in
children do not change with development. To be precise, even though the overall
processing is more efficient (i.e., faster), adults continue to process their own perspective
(i.e., egocentric interference) when being asked to judge another agent’s perspective and
vice versa. Finally, the dual-task study suggests that inhibition processes involved in
executive functioning play a role in selection but not calculation components of level-1
visual perspective taking. This last finding suggests that level-1 visual perspective taking
involves cognitively efficient processes.
Notably, level-1 visual perspective taking has not been examined in older adults.
The current study was the first to investigate if older adults are prone to altercentric
interference effects. Moreover, the current study examined the impact of inhibition
resources on level-1 visual perspective taking performance in an older adult sample.
Finally, it was of particular interest to examine if there was also evidence of cognitively
efficient processes in calculating the agent’s perspective in an aging sample. Considering
that older adults are disproportionately impaired on dual tasks and demonstrate declines
in explicit mental state understanding tasks, if evidence is found in an older adult sample
that calculating the agent’s perspective involves efficient processes, then this would
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provide further support for the argument of cognitively efficient processes being involved
in certain aspects of mental state understanding.
Summary
Many of the studies examining mental state understanding during aging have used
theory of mind story tasks in which participants read a passage regarding two characters
and subsequently answer questions regarding the characters’ mental states (e.g., Maylor
et al., 2002). Other studies have used visual stimuli in which participants must infer the
mental states from videos (e.g., Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007), photos (e.g., the Eyes
Test, Phillips, MacLean, & Allen, 2002), or cartoons (e.g., Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, &
Archibald, 2000). In 2012, a meta-analysis was published that examined theory of mind
abilities in older adults. The analysis included 23 datasets from 21 studies (published and
unpublished) and found older adults (with a mean age of 65 years or older) performed
worse compared to young adults on theory of mind tasks with an average effect size of .36 (Henry et al.,, 2012). This negative effect size indicates that aging is associated with
a moderate decline in theory of mind abilities.
In addition to age-related declines in theory of mind tasks, however, an extensive
body of research indicates that older adults are impaired relative to young adults in many
cognitive domains. Given that theory of mind has been shown to be associated with
executive functioning and working memory in both developmental (e.g., Mutter, Alcorn,
& Welsh, 2006; Sabbagh et al., 2006) and adult samples (e.g., Lin et al., 2010; Newton,
& de Villiers, 2007), researchers have examined the contribution of these cognitive
functions on theory of mind performance during aging. Currently, there is evidence to
suggest that processing speed, executive functioning, and working memory mediates
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some of the observed decline during aging (e.g., Rakoczy, Harder-Kasten, & Sturm,
2011). More research is needed to unravel which specific aspects of general cognitive
decline impact mental state understanding during aging. Furthermore, it is unclear if
some aspects of mental state understanding remain unimpaired during the aging process.
Compared to theory of mind tasks, level-1 perspective taking may remain relatively intact
during aging.
Hypotheses
In terms of level-1 visual perspective taking, I expect older adults to show both
egocentric and altercentric interference effects. These interference effects would be
demonstrated if older adults are significantly faster on consistent (i.e., matching)
compared to inconsistent (i.e., not matching) conditions. Specifically, I expect older
adults to show interference effects when being asked to judge another perspective
(egocentric effect) and when being asked to judge self perspective (altercentric effect).
In regards to the dual-task trials, the rationale for the current study follows that
presented by Qureshi, Apperly, and Samson (2010). Firstly, the effect of dual-task trials
on selection processes during the level-1 perspective taking was examined. If executive
functioning is necessary for participants to select the relevant perspective, then dual-task
trials should result in larger processing costs for both consistent and inconsistent
conditions with disproportionately large processing costs for inconsistent conditions.
Secondly, the influence of the dual task on calculation of perspective was examined. If
the agent’s perspective was not calculated automatically but instead relies on executive
processes, then inconsistent dual-task trials should result in a reduction of altercentric
interference compared to inconsistent alone trials. That is, participants would respond
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faster in the dual-task inconsistent trials when self perspective was required because they
no longer calculated the agent’s perspective. In contrast, if the agent’s perspective was
calculated automatically during inconsistent trials, then the secondary task should
increase the altercentric interference. In accord with Qureshi et al.’s findings, I expected
the latter outcome. In other words, dual-task trials should result in an increased
altercentric effect for older adults, demonstrating that participants automatically calculate
the agent’s perspective.
In summary, my research questions and hypotheses are as follows:
QI

Is there evidence of cognitively efficient processes in level-1 visual
perspective taking in an older adult sample?

H1

Older adults will perform significantly slower and/or more error prone
when their perspective differs from that of the avatars perspective when
being asked to judge other perspective on the level-1 perspective taking
task (i.e., indicating egocentric bias).

H2

Older adults will perform significantly slower and/or more error prone
when their perspective differs from that of the avatars perspective when
being asked to judge self perspective on the level-1 perspective taking task
(i.e., indicating altercentric bias).

H3

In regards to examining whether executive function is involved in selection
processes, the dual-task trials will result in larger processing costs in
consistent and inconsistent trials with disproportionately larger costs in the
inconsistent trials for older adults.

H4

In regards to examining whether executive function is involved in
calculation processes, dual-task trials will result in a significantly larger
altercentric effect for older adults compared to alone trials. If this result is
confirmed, then this would suggest that calculation of the other
perspective does not rely on executive function processes.

Q2

In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working memory
contribute to theory of mind?

H5

Verbal working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance
on a theory of mind story task compared to spatial working memory.
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Q3

In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working memory
contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking?

H6

Spatial working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance
on a level-1 visual perspective taking task compared verbal working
memory.
In the section that follows, the method for the current study is described including

participants, sample size, instruments, and procedures. Finally, the statistical analyses
that were used to test the aforementioned hypotheses are described.
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CHAPTER III
METHOD
The current study employs both experimental and correlational research designs.
The population of interest is older adults with the goal of investigating performance on
several tasks using a within subjects research design. University of Northern Colorado’s
(UNC) institutional review board (IRB) reviewed and approved this study (see Appendix
A for approval letter). The consent form can be seen in Appendices B. Two amendments
were made to the original IRB application. The first amendment requested an extension
of the sampling procedures to include an out-of-state sub-sample of participants. The
second amendment was for two changes in instruments. These amendments were
approved by the IRB (Appendix C).
Participants
Participants consisted of 42 older adults (23 female, 19 male) between the ages of
60 and 87 (m = 68.25 years, sd = 5.40). Male and female participants did not differ by
age (t(41) = -1.259, p = .215). See Table 2 for a break down of gender by five-year age
ranges. The sample was highly educated with a mean years of education of 16.18 (sd =
3.10); however, males had significantly more years of education compared to females
(t(41) = 2.06, p = .047, d = .64). Seventy-four percent of the participants were retired and
most of the participants were living with a significant other (79%). See Table 3 for a
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summary of age, gender, and education demographics. Further details regarding the full
sample are included in Appendix D (see Appendix E for the demographics form).

Table 2
Gender of Participants Broken into Five-year Increments
Age

Males
N
9
6
3
1

61-65
66-70
71-75
76-80
80+
Total

19

Females
N
6
10
4
2
1
23

Total
N
15
16
7
3
1
42

Table 3
Age, Gender, and Education for the Full Sample
N

Mean

SD

Age
Male
19
67.16
Female
23
69.196
Total
42
67.80
Education*
Male
17
17.24
Female
21
15.27
Total
39
16.13
* Missing data for some participants on this demographic variable

4.41
6.02
4.56
3.46
2.51
3.08

During the level-1 visual perspective taking dual task, one participant decided not
to finish the testing block. Another participant had an error rate ranging from 29 to 83
percent incorrect responses on the dual task. These two participants were dropped from
the analysis involving the level-1 visual perspective taking task. This resulted in a
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sample size of 40 (21 females and 19 males) with a mean age of 67.66 (sd = 4.54) for the
analysis of variance (ANOVA) that examined the level-1 visual perspective taking task.
The current study included only aging in place participants. Aging in place
consists of individuals living in one’s own home during the aging process (McDonough
& Davitt, 2011). According to the 2001 United States Census, 95% of all individuals 65
years and older are living in place. In the current study, an aging in place sample was
obtained with the goal of attaining a sample representative of the larger population.
Sampling Procedures
Participants were recruited from two suburban regions: Colorado’s Front Range
(N=28) and a city within an hour’s drive of Phoenix Arizona (N= 14). Convenience
sampling methods were employed including snowball sampling. Approximately 120
emails were sent, which yielded an approximate response rate of 8 percent. The rest of
the sample was obtained through word of mouth. Recruiting procedures consisted of
asking individuals if they were interested in volunteering an hour and half of their time.
Participants were given a 10-dollar gift certificate as a token of appreciation.
Measures
Level-1 Perspective Taking
A Dell laptop computer running Windows 7 and DMDX software (Forster &
Forster, 2003) was used to present the stimuli for this task. Response time data were also
collected and recorded by DMDX. It is important to note that there is a long history of
using reaction time as a measure in aging samples (e.g., Galton, 1885; Koga & Morandt,
1923). While there are a variety of methods used to measure cognition, response time
continues to be one of the most frequently used dependent variables in cognitive aging
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studies. Participants were seated at a table in their home where the laptop computer was
set up. The stimuli for this task can be viewed in Figure 2 and are based on Samson at al.
(2010).1 After completing the consent process, both verbal and written instructions were
provided to the participants (see Appendix F for written instructions).

Figure. 2. Illustration of the Conditions for the Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking Task
Notes: This graphic was designed by Qureshi et al. The first frame indicates which
perspective (i.e., self or other) participants responded to; the second frame indicates the
number of dots participants verified; in the third frame participants made a response.

1

I am deeply grateful to Ian Apperly, Dana Samson, and Adam Qureshi who shared with
me all the files for this task including, instructions, stimuli and the programming code.
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Each trial consisted of three stimuli that were presented on a computer screen.
First, participants were presented with the words “YOU” or “HE/SHE” (“HE” for male
participants and “SHE” for female participants). This first frame directed the participants
to which perspective they were to respond to; “YOU” indicated to the participant to take
their own perspective (i.e., self perspective) and “HE/SHE” indicated to the participant to
take the agent’s perspective (i.e., other perspective). In the second frame, the stimulus
consisted of a number ranging from zero to three. Lastly, the third stimulus contained the
prompt from which the participant was to respond. This final image per trial consisted of
a picture of a room with the right, left, and back walls visible and varied by the number of
red disks that were displayed on the walls. Red disks were displayed either on both right
and left walls or just one of the walls (i.e., right and/or left). Some of the trials contained
no red disks on the walls. In addition to the variation of red disks, a computer-generated
agent (male for male participants and female for female participants) was displayed in the
center of the room and faced either right or left walls. The participant’s task was to
indicate with a mouse press whether or not the number shown in the second frame
matched the number of disks either they could see or the agent could see. That is, the
participant’s task was to indicate if the number presented to them in the second stimuli
(i.e., zero, one, two, or three) matched the number of red dots that either they could see
(i.e., the self condition) or the number of red dots that the agent could see (i.e., the other
condition) in the final scene. A “yes” response was required when the picture matched
the number of disks visible from the prompted perspective. A “no” response was
required when the picture did not match the number of disks visible from the prompted
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perspective. If no response was made after 4,000 ms, the trial timed out and the next trial
began.
In summary, there were four possible conditions. In half the conditions
participants were asked to judge their own perspective (self conditions; “YOU”) and in
the other half, participants were asked to judge the agent’s perspective (other conditions;
“HE/SHE”). Additionally, in some conditions the participant saw the same number of
disks as the agent (consistent condition), and in other conditions the participant saw a
different number of disks compared to the agent (inconsistent condition). That is, the
consistency effect was testing for when the perspective of the participant was the same or
different from the perspective of the agent. These experimental conditions produced two
independent variables each with two levels for this task. Following the analyses
conducted by Qureshi et al. (2010) processing costs were calculated, which were
produced by dividing the reaction time by the proportion of correct responses for this task.
In addition to processing costs, reaction time was also used as a dependent variable.
Dual-task
This task was modeled after the dual-task presented in Qureshi et al. (2010),
which consisted of a level-1 perspective taking task with a secondary inhibition task (see
below). All aspects of the level-1 perspective taking task was identical to what was
described above. That is, the task contained four possible conditions: self, other,
consistent, and inconsistent conditions.
Secondary executive functioning task. The secondary executive functioning
task required inhibitory control and was developed based on the inhibition demands of
Luria’s tapping task (Luria, 1966). Luria’s tapping task consists of the presentation of
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either one or two auditory tones. Participants are asked to press a key either one or two
times, in a pattern that is incongruent with number of tones that they heard. In the current
study, a variation of Luria’s tapping task was implemented for the purpose of not
confounding the numerical components of the level-1 visual perspective taking task (i.e.,
number of red disks) with the numerical aspect of the Luria’s tapping task (i.e., number
of tones). The inhibition task for the current study consisted of an auditory presentation
of the words “day” and “night” instead of tones. Participants were asked to press either a
picture of a moon or a picture of a sun on a computer mouse in a pattern that was
incongruent with the words they heard. That is, if they heard “day”, then they pressed the
picture of a moon; if they heard “night”, then they pressed the picture of the moon. A
Macintosh laptop computer running OS X Lion and Superlab software (Cedrus, 2012)
presented this task and recorded the response time data.
The stimuli used for the day-night task in the current study were modeled after a
task designed to measure inhibition of response conflict in children (Gerstadt, Hong, &
Diamond, 1994). In the child version of the Day-Night task, participants were shown a
set of pictures with two different stimuli and were instructed to say “day” when they were
shown cards with pictures of a moon on a black background and to say “night” when they
were shown pictures of a sun on a white background. The version of the task used in the
current study was chosen for the purpose of using auditory stimuli instead of visual
stimuli.
Theory of Mind Story Task
A revised version of the Strange Story Task (SST, White, Hill, Happé, & Frith,
2009) was used as a measure of theory of mind. The SST consists of short stories; half
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the stories contain mental state reasoning and the other half do not require mental state
reasoning, which consist of the control stories. The theory of mind stories involves two
characters in which one character has to make an inference regarding the other
character’s mental state (e.g., white lie, irony, and persuasion). The control stories
contain information regarding a physical or mechanical outcome. There were 10 items
for each subscale (i.e., theory of mind stories and control stories) for a total of 20 items.
Participants were asked to answer two questions pertaining to the vignette; in the mental
state stories, participants were required to make inferences regarding the mental state of
one of the characters in the story; in the control stories, participants were required to
answer questions relating to the physical story. Several studies (Castelli et al. 2010;
Maylor et al., 2002; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004) examining older adult theory of mind
abilities have used variations of the SST.
Each correctly answered question received two points and partially correct
answers received one point. This resulted with each item having a range of zero to two
and the total maximum score for each subscale was 20. Scoring required subjective
evaluation of participant answers; thus, inter-reliability was conducted. After two raters
blindly scored the SST inter-rater was calculated; Cohen’s kappa was .76. A third rater
examined all discrepancies and made a decision regarding the score for each item until
100 percent agreement was reached. Previous research also reported Cohen’s kappa of
.76 for the SST (Kaland et al., 2005).
Working Memory
Although the structure of working memory demonstrates age invariance (Park et
al., 2002), performance declines have been observed across the lifespan (e.g., Babcock &
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Salthouse, 1990; Hale et al., 2011). Specifically, evidence from cognitive aging studies
suggests there are differential age-related declines for spatial versus verbal working
memory (Jenkins, Myerson, Joerding, & Hale, 2000; Hale et al., 2011). Furthermore,
complex span tasks, which involve both storage and processing demands, demonstrate
greater age-related decline compared to simple span tasks, which requires storage of
information but not processing (Bopp & Verhaeghen, 2005). Thus, I have chosen to
measure both verbal and spatial working memory using complex span tasks described
below.
Verbal working memory. The Digit Span from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale-IV (Wechsler, 2008) was used as a measure of verbal working memory. The Digit
Span is comprised of three subscales: forward, backward, and sequencing. For the
forward subscale, the researcher reads a series of numbers and the participant’s task is to
recall the numbers in the same order. For Digit Span backward, the participant’s task is
to recall the numbers in reverse order; for sequencing, the participant is to recall the
numbers in ascending order. Each item consists of two trials that contain the same
amount of numbers (e.g., item number one contains two trials each with two numbers and
item number two contains two trials each with three numbers). The subscale is
discontinued if the participant receives a score of zero on two consecutive trials within
the same item. There are eight items per subscale with two trials per item. Either one or
zero points are awarded for correct and incorrect trials respectively. The points are added
to provide three subscale scores (with a maximum possible score of 16 points for each
subscale) and a total score with a maximum possible score of 48. Previous research has
found test-retest reliability for Digit Span has been reported to be .83 (Wechsler, 1997).
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Spatial working memory. The Symbol Span subscale from the Wechsler’s
Memory Scale-IV (WMS-IV, Wechsler, 2009) was used as an estimate of spatial working
memory. Symbol Span involves both storage and manipulation of visual details and has
been designed to reduce verbal working memory and motor skills (Holdnack & Drozdick,
2009). The Symbol Span requires that participants visually examine shapes for 5 seconds
from a flip chart held by the researcher. Immediately following the presented shapes,
several more shapes are shown to the participant, some of which were previously shown.
The participant’s task is to indicate, in the correct order, which shapes they saw in the
first set of stimuli (i.e., that were on the page from left to right). The researcher records
the participants’ exact responses and scores the task at a later time.
Two points are awarded if the participant correctly identifies the shapes in the
correct order. One point is awarded if the participant correctly identifies the shapes but in
the incorrect order. If the participant does not accurately identify all shapes, then zero
points are awarded for that item. The points are added to provide a total score for this
measure. If a participant scores a zero on four consecutive items, then the subscale is
discontinued. The total Symbol Span consists of 26 items with a total possible score of
52. Reliability coefficients for Symbol Span have been reported to range from .72 for
test-retest and .76 to .92 for internal consistency (Holdnack & Drozdick, 2009).
Demographics
Using a self-report questionnaire, demographic information was collected to
describe the sample characteristics of the groups (see Appendix E; size 14 MS reference
sans serif font was used). The demographic information consisted of age, gender, marital
status, years of education, occupation, comfort with computers, perceived health status,
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and level of physical activity. To measure level of physical activity, I used item number
five from the Physical Activity Scale for Elderly Adults (Washburn, Smith, Jette, &
Janney, 1993; PASE). This item asks participants “Over the past seven days, how often
did you engage in strenuous sport and recreational activities such as jogging, cycling,
swimming, singles tennis, aerobic dance, skiing, or other similar activities?” Response
choices included: never, seldom (1-2 days), sometimes (3-4 days), and often (5-7 days).
Previous research with older adult participants found that this item differentiated between
exercisers and non-exercisers (Kirkland, Karlin, Babkes Stellino, & Pulos, 2010).
Procedures
At the beginning of each data collection session, the purpose of the study was
explained and the consent process was completed. After the consent process, the
computerized tasks were administered first, which included the level-1 visual perspective
taking task conducted alone as well as the dual task version. Verbal instructions were
provided and participants read instructions where it was emphasized to respond as
quickly and as accurately as possible. Appendix F provides an example of the
instructions (with the exception of the size and type of font; size 14 MS reference sans
serif font was used). Following procedures previously conducted, (Qureshi et al., 2010;
Surtees & Apperly, 2012), participants first completed practice blocks. Participants
completed 26 practice trials (Qureshi et al., 2010) of the level-1 perspective taking task,
30 practice trials on the secondary inhibition task, and 52 practice trials of the dual-task
(i.e., level-1 perspective taking and inhibition task). The practice trials took
approximately 10 minutes to complete.
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The test blocks consisted of 52 trials of the level-1 perspective taking (without the
dual-task) and 52 dual-task trials (level-1 perspective taking with inhibition task
performed simultaneously), which took approximately 15 minutes to complete. After a
5-minute break the SST, digit span, and symbol span tasks were administered. These
final three tasks took between 40 and 60 minutes to complete and were counterbalanced
across participants. In sum, the data collection time with participants, including consent
and debriefing procedures, took approximately 90 minutes to complete. The following
list represents a summary of the data collection procedure:
(a) Consent process
(b) Practice trials for level-1 perspective taking, inhibition task, and dual-task
(c) One block of the level-1 perspective taking alone with 52 trials
(d) One block of the dual-task condition with 52 trials
(e) Strange story task
(f) Digit span
(g) Symbol span
(h) Demographics
(i) Debriefing
Data Analysis
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS version 22. Preliminary data screening
was conducted on all variables. Descriptive statistics including means, standard
deviations, and minimum and maximum scores for each of the continuous variables were
obtained. No errors were identified in the continuous variables. The demographic data
were examined through case summaries; three errors were identified and corrected.
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Histograms were produced to examine the frequency distributions for the
continuous variables of level-1 visual perspective taking, theory of mind stories, verbal
and spatial working memory. Consistent with reaction time data, the histograms showed
strong positive skew for all variables included in the level-1 visual perspective taking
task. Normality was further assessed by producing skewness and kurtosis statistics as
well as Shapiro-Wilk test of significance. These distribution statistics were examined for
each dependent variable (i.e., processing costs and reaction time) at each level of the
independent variables for level-1 visual perspective taking. Significant positive skew
was present for both processing costs and reaction time variables. A common method for
reducing positive skew on reaction time variables is to calculate transformations on the
skewed data (Osborne, 2002; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Using this method, processing
costs were transformed with the natural logarithm. For reaction time, the presence of
outliers contributed to non-normality; thus, the data were winsorized by the upper 95th
percentile (Wilcox, 1997, 2005). That is, all cases with scores above the 95th percentile
were condensed down to the 95th percentile score. See Appendix G for processing costs
and reaction time distribution statistics before and after the data were winsorized.
Scores for the theory of mind story task had negative skew. Three participants
with scores more that 2.5 standard deviations below the mean contributed to this negative
skew. The total subscale for verbal working memory (digit span forward, backward, and
sequence) was normally distributed. When examining the verbal working memory
subscales separately, digit span forward and backward had small deviations in normality.
Verbal working memory as measured by digit span sequence was normally distributed.
Spatial working memory as measured by symbol span was normally distributed.
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Appendix H provides the distribution statistics for the theory of mind story task and
verbal and spatial working memory. The following three sections reports the data
analyses conducted for each of the research questions.
Examining Cognitive Efficiency
The first research question was, “Is there evidence of cognitively efficient
processes in level-1 visual perspective taking in an older adult sample?” Two repeated
measures analysis of variances (ANOVA) were conducted to test the first four hypotheses
associated with this question (one with processing costs and one with reaction time as the
dependent variable). As stated above, processing costs and reaction time distributions
showed significant positive skew. To adjust for the non-normal distributions, processing
costs were transformed by the natural log and reaction time variables were winsorized.
Thus, the first ANOVA was conducted with a natural log transformation of processing
costs as the dependent variable. The second ANOVA was conducted with reaction time
winsorized as the dependent variable.
It is important to note that even though between and within person variance is
greater in older compared to young adults (Hulsch, MacDonald, & Dixon, 2002), reaction
time measures have been used successfully to estimate a wide-range of cognitive
processes during the aging process. In the current study, the research questions and
corresponding analyses with processing costs and reaction time as the dependent
measures are investigated by a within subject design. Therefore, the repeated measure
design accounts for individual differences in speed and manual dexterity.
The data analysis was modeled based on Qureshi et al.’s (2010) study. Only “yes”
trials were analyzed because of the unbalanced number of answers of “yes” compared to
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“no” trials. That is, due to the configuration of the dots, there were less mismatched “no”
trials compared to matched “yes” trials. For both the alone and dual-task versions of the
level-1 visual perspective taking, processing costs and reaction times were utilized as the
dependent variables, which were calculated for each individual by condition. As
previously discussed, the nature log transformation was conducted on processing costs
and the reaction time data were winsorized by the top 95th percentile.
The factors that repeated for level-1 visual perspective taking were consistency
(consistent versus inconsistent), perspective (self versus other), and task (alone versus
dual). The consistency factor compared conditions when the perspective of the
participant was either the same or different from the perspective of the agent. The
perspective factor compared conditions when the participant was asked to take their own
perspective (i.e., self) versus conditions where they were asked to take the agent’s
perspective (i.e., other). The level-1 perspective taking alone compared to the dual-task
condition tested for a task effect. In total, the following conditions were entered into the
ANOVA: a) Alone Other consistent; b) Alone Other Inconsistent; c) Alone Self
Consistent; d) Alone Self Inconsistent; e) Dual Other consistent; f) Dual Other
Inconsistent; g) Dual Self Consistent; and h) Dual Self Inconsistent.
Based on a power analysis conducted with G*Power 3.1 software (Faul,
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), a sample size of 38 was determined as necessary for
a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with partial eta squared set at .33, alpha set at .05,
and power set at .95. Table 4 provides a summary of the predicted outcomes for the
ANOVA based on the hypotheses for the current study.
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Table 4
Predicted Outcomes Based on a Repeated Measures ANOVA
Hypotheses
Older adults will perform
significantly slower and/or more
error prone when their
perspective differs from that of
the avatars perspective when
being asked to judge other
perspective on the level-1
perspective taking task (i.e.,
indicating egocentric bias)

Hypothesis would be
confirmed with the
following results
Consistency effect
(inconsistent >
consistent
for other perspective)

Older adults will perform
significantly slower and/or more
error prone when their
perspective differs from that of
the avatars perspective when
being asked to judge self
perspective on the level-1
perspective taking task (i.e.,
indicating altercentric bias)

Consistency effect

In regards to examining whether
executive function is involved in
selection processes, the dual-task
trials will result in larger
processing costs in consistent
and inconsistent trials with
disproportionately larger costs in
the inconsistent trials for older
adults

Interaction effect of:
Task x Consistency

In regards to examining whether
executive function is involved in
calculation processes, dual-task
trials will result in a significantly
larger altercentric effect (i.e.,
slower RT’s for inconsistent self
trials) for older adults compared
to alone trials

Interaction effect of:
Consistency x Task

(inconsistent >
consistent
for self perspective)

(dual-task > alone
for both inconsistent
and consistent trials but
sig. larger for
inconsistent)

(inconsistent >
consistent for both
dual-task and alone
trials but sig. larger for
dual condition)

Description
Participants show higher
processing costs (i.e.,
are slower) on
inconsistent compared
to consistent trials when
being asked to judge the
agent’s perspective

Participants show higher
processing costs (i.e.,
are slower) on
inconsistent compared
to consistent trials when
being asked to judge
their own perspective

Participants show higher
processing costs (i.e.,
are slower) on dual-task
compared to alone trials
for both consistent and
inconsistent trials with
significantly larger costs
for the inconsistent trials
Participants show a
significantly larger
altercentric interference
effect (i.e.,inconsistent >
consistent for selfperspective trials) for
dual-task compared to
alone trials
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Prior to analysis, the assumptions for a repeated measures ANOVA were
examined, which include normality and sphericity. As characteristic of reaction time
data, the first assumption was violated due to the presence of significant positive skew.
To adjust for the non-normal distributions, transformations were conducted on the data;
processing costs were transformed by the natural log and reaction time data were
winsorized (see Appendix G for distribution statistics before and after transformations).
The second assumption for a repeated measures ANOVA is sphericity (Huynh & Feldt,
1970). Sphericity is similar to the assumption of homogeneity of variances that is
necessary for a between-subject ANOVA; however, sphericity requires that the
differences in variance between each level of the independent variables are equal (i.e., the
covariances between each level are equal, Field, 1988). In the case of the current study,
sphericity was satisfied since there were only two levels for each independent variable.
That is, the assumption of sphericity was met since level-1 visual perspective taking task
included only one covariance for each repeated measure.
Finally, a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with the same three
factors (i.e., consistency, perspective and task) as the repeated measures and a betweensubject factor of gender (male versus female). Assumptions for a mixed-design ANOVA
include independence of observations, normal distributions, and homogeneity of variance.
The first assumption, independence of observations, is required for the between-subject
factor, which in this case is gender. The assumption of independence of observations
involves how the sample is obtained (Howell, 2007). There should be no dependency
between participants, which requires that the participants are randomly selected from the
population. Nonrandom sampling methods were employed in the current study, thus the
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first assumption was violated; however, participants were recruited from two states in
several different counties with the goal of obtaining a sample that would increase the
likelihood of independence of observations between participants.
To appropriately interpret an F test statistic, in addition to the assumption of
normality, a mixed-design ANOVA requires the assumption of homogeneity of variance.
Levene’s test of equal error variances was examined for each of the eight variables. One
variable had a significant p-value (Self Inconsistent trials on the Alone task), indicating
homogeneity of variance was violated for that variable (F(1, 36) = 8.023, p = .007);
however, when sample sizes are balanced, ANOVA is relatively robust against violations
of equal variance (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). All other variables were non-significant
indicating these variables had equal error variances (see Appendix I for the Levene
statistics). Lastly, Box’s (1954) test of equal covariance was non-significant (F(1,36) =
1.212, p = 1.80), also indicating that the assumption of equal covariance was satisfied.
Theory of mind and Working
Memory
The second research question was, “In an older adult sample, how does verbal and
spatial working memory contribute to theory of mind?” To test my hypothesis that verbal
working memory makes a stronger contribution compared to spatial working memory on
theory of mind performance, verbal working memory was added in the first step. After
verbal working memory was added to the regression, spatial working memory was added
in the second step. The hierarchical regression was conducted using listwise deletion. In
addition to examining the R2 for each predictor variable (i.e., spatial and verbal working
memory), the R2 change and the p-value associated with the F-change was examined.
The R2 change and the F-change examines the amount of additional variance explained
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by the second predictor added to the model, which in this case was spatial working
memory. Using G*Power 3.1 software, a sample size of 42 was determined as necessary
for a regression with two predictor variables, alpha set at .05, power set at .95, and a
partial R squared set to .25 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).
Prior to conducting the aforementioned regression analysis, the assumptions of
linearity, homoscedasticity (i.e., equal variance of the residuals), and normality (i.e., the
error distributions should be normally distributed) were assessed. Scatterplots were
produced to examine linearity between the outcome variable (theory of mind stories) and
the predictor variables (verbal working memory, and spatial working memory). The two
scatterplots indicated adequate linearity. To assess normality of residuals (residuals
should be normally distributed around zero), probability-probability plots (P-P plots)
were examined for each of the variables (theory of mind stories, verbal and spatial
working memory). The P-P plots demonstrated that the residuals were approximately
normally distributed and therefore was adequately met.
Finally, multicollinearity (i.e., where correlations among two or more variables
have almost perfect linear relationships, Mason & Perreault, 1991) in the predictor
variables was examined through checking the variance inflation factors (VIF’s); VIF’s
above ten (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005) or in some cases five (O'Brien, 2007) are highly
correlated. For the current study, the VIF’s were 1.122, indicating this assumption was
adequately met.
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking
and Working Memory
My third research question was, “In an older adult sample, how does verbal and
spatial working memory contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking?” Two

60
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to answer this research question. The
first examined the impact of verbal and spatial working memory on the level-1 visual
perspective taking task alone. The second examined the impact of verbal and spatial
working memory on the dual-task version. Thus, the two hierarchical regression analyses
used different outcome variables with the same predictor variables. To test my
hypothesis that spatial working memory makes a stronger contribution compared to
verbal working memory on level-1 visual perspective taking performance, spatial
working memory was added in the first step. Next, verbal working memory was added to
the model in the second step (i.e., after verbal working memory). Listwise deletion was
used while carrying out the regression. In addition to examining the R2 for each predictor
variable (i.e., spatial and verbal working memory), R2-change and the corresponding pvalue associated with the F-change was examined for verbal working memory, which
was added in the second step.
The same assumptions of normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity (i.e., equal
variance of the residuals) that were examined for the previous hierarchical regression
were also examined prior to this second regression analysis. Since the predictor variables
are the same for both regressions, only the assumptions specific to level-1 visual
perspective taking task needed to be examined.
Four scatter plots examined the assumption of linearity; first, with level-1 visual
perspective taking alone on the y-axis and verbal working memory (i.e., digit span
sequence) on the x-axis; and second, with level-1 visual perspective taking alone on the
y-axis and spatial working memory on the x-axis. The last two scatter plots examined the
dual-task version of level-1 visual perspective taking on the y-axis and each of the
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working memory measures on the x-axis. The scatterplots demonstrated that the
assumption of linearity was met. Residual values for level-1 visual perspective taking
were examined with P-P plots. All level-1 visual perspective taking variables showed
adequate normality of the residuals (i.e., residuals were approximately equally distributed
around zero).
Demographics
Data collected from the self-report demographics survey have been used to
describe the sample. Descriptive statistics were calculated for the two continuous
variables of age and education. Frequency distributions were examined for all
categorical demographic variables including, marital status, retirement (i.e., yes or no),
exercise, health, familiarity with computers, part-time or full-time work, and finally
volunteering and homemaker status (i.e., yes or no). See appendix D for demographic
characteristics of the sample.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results are organized into three broad sections based on their corresponding
research questions. First, the results for the repeated measures ANOVA are presented,
which corresponds to the first research question. The second and third sections report the
results for the hierarchical regression, which corresponds to the second and third research
questions. The statistical assumptions were presented in the previous chapter in the data
analyses sections. All assumptions for a repeated measures ANOVA were adequately
met. To address the positive skew that is characteristic of reaction time data,
transformations on the level-1 visual perspective taking variables were conducted. Prior
to reporting the results for the first research question, the variables are reviewed and brief
summaries of the hypotheses are provided.
Is there Evidence of Cognitively Efficient Processes in
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking in an
Older Adult Sample?
To review, the level-1 visual perspective taking task includes three independent
variables: perspective (self vs. other), consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent), and task
(alone vs. dual). The results reported in the current section pertains to the first four
hypotheses testing for egocentric and altercentric interference effects as well as the role
of executive functioning during level-1 visual perspective taking. The first hypothesis
tested if older adults are prone to egocentric interference. Egocentric interference
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corresponds to slower reaction times for inconsistent compared to consistent trials when
being asked to judge the agent’s perspective (i.e., Other condition). The second
hypothesis tested if older adults demonstrate altercentric interference. Altercentric
interference corresponds to slower reaction times for inconsistent compared to consistent
trials when being asked to judge owns own perspective (i.e., Self condition). To be clear,
if processing costs are larger for inconsistent compared to consistent trials when
participants make judgments for the other perspective, then this corresponds to egocentric
interference. If processing costs are larger for inconsistent compared to consistent trials
when participants respond to their own perspective (i.e., self perspective), then this
corresponds to altercentric inference effects.
The effect of the dual task on level-1 visual perspective taking tests for the third
and forth hypotheses regarding the role of executive functioning in level-1 visual
perspective taking. Two sets of analysis are reported in the following section: a)
processing costs as the dependent variable, and b) reaction time as the dependent variable.
Processing costs were calculated for each participant by dividing reaction time by the
proportion of correct response in each condition; hence, smaller processing costs are an
indication of better performance (i.e., quick response time and high accuracy).
Processing Costs
Descriptive statistics for the initial processing costs (without transformations) are
presented in Table 5 (see Appendix J for descriptive statistics with the natural log
transformation). A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA conducted with the natural log
transformation as the dependent variable revealed two main effects and two significant
interactions. There was a main effect of consistency (Inconsistent > Consistent; F(1, 39) =
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64.243, p < .000, ηp2 = .622). The consistency effect tested for the difference in
conditions when the participant’s and the agent’s perspectives match (i.e., Consistent)
compared to when the perspectives do not match (i.e., Inconsistent). There was a main
effect for task condition (Dual > Alone; F(1, 39) = 4.713, p = .036, ηp2 = .108). The
analysis did not reveal a main effect for perspective (F(1, 39) = 3.079, p = .087, ηp2 = .073).
Significant interactions were found between task and perspective (F(1, 39) = 6.855, p
= .013, ηp2 = .149) and between perspective and consistency (F(1, 39) = 8.479, p = .006, ηp2
= .179). No significant interaction was found between task and consistency (F(1, 39)
= .447, p = .508, ηp2 = .011). See Figure 3 for processing costs by each condition.

Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for L-1 VP: Processing Costs without Transformations
N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Other Consistent

40

969.45

226.00

661.00

1553.00

Other Inconsistent

40

1358.30

650.35

616.00

4183.18

Self Consistent

40

975.82

283.47

608.00

1882.00

Self Inconsistent

40

1118.52

491.35

647.00

2820.36

Dual
Other Consistent

40

1063.54

509.57

548.00

3333.33

Other Inconsistent

40

1364.98

582.32

483.00

3137.93

Self Consistent

40

1164.13

485.04

639.00

3196.15

Self Inconsistent

40

1257.77

502.73

664.00

4519.52

Alone

Note. L-1VP = level-1 visual perspective taking
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Figure. 3. Processing Costs for each Condition
Notes: The error bars are confidence intervals (CI) calculated with the Loftus and Masson
(1994) formula in the natural log form (CI, ±.00126) then transformed back to reaction
time units by calculating the antilog after the analysis. The curved brackets show the
egocentric interference, which is indicated by the faster Consistent compared to
Inconsistent conditions for the Other perspective.

Post hoc analysis examined the interaction between task and perspective, which
revealed one significant contrast. The Self perspective was significantly faster for the
Alone (self alone = 989.30 ms) compared to the Dual task (self dual = 1137.97 ms)
condition. That is, a task effect was found only when participants judged their own
perspective. See figure 4 for an illustration of the interaction. Table 6 reports the
pairwise contrasts, which includes confidence intervals derived by the Loftus and Masson
(1994) method for repeated measures ANOVA’s (95% CI = ± .058971).
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Figure. 4. Line Graph of Task by Perspective Interaction for Processing Costs
Notes: A significant contrast was found between Alone and Dual task conditions for Self
perspective.
Table 6
Task by Perspective Interaction with Processing Costs as the Dependent Variable
95% Confidence Intervals (CI)
Condition

Mean

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Alone
Other

1082.69

1020.48

1148.22

Self

989.30

932.65

1049.40

Other

1117.69

1053.66

1185.56

Self

1137.97

1072.80

1207.09

Dual

Note. CI’s derived from the Loftus and Masson (1994) formula in the natural log (CI ±.
.058971) then transformed using the antilog. The significant contrast was between the
Alone and Dual task conditions for the Self perspective (note the non-overlapping CI’s).
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Post hoc analysis examined the interaction between consistency and perspective.
One significant contrast was found. A significant consistency effect (inconsistent >
consistent) was found for Other but not for Self perspective. That is, for the Other
perspective (i.e., when participants were asked to judge the avatar’s perspective)
participants were significantly slower for the Inconsistent conditions (i.e., when the
perspectives did not match, inconsistent = 1262.69 ms) compared to the Consistent
conditions (i.e., when the perspectives matched, consistent = 958.15 ms). Whereas, there
was no difference between consistency conditions for the Self perspective (i.e., when
participants were asked to judge their own perspective). See Figure 5 for the line plot
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Figure. 5. Line Graph of the Perspective by Consistency Interaction for Processing Costs
Notes: The significant contrast was between the Consistent and Inconsistent conditions
for the Other perspective.
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Table 7
Perspective by Consistency Interaction with Processing Costs as the Dependent Variable
95% Confidence Intervals (CI)
Condition

Mean

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Consistent

958.15

874.30

1050.04

Inconsistent

1262.69

1152.19

1383.79

Consistent

1015.36

926.50

1112.74

Inconsistent

1109.87

1012.74

1216.31

Other

Self

Note. The Loftus and Masson (1994) formula was used to calculate the CI (± .091581),
followed by an antilog calculation. The only contrast with non-overlapping confidence
intervals (i.e. indicating a significant effect) was between other Consistent and other
Inconsistent conditions for the Other perspective.

Reaction Time
Descriptive statistics for reaction time after the variables were winsorized are
displayed in Table 8 (see Appendix K for descriptive statistics for reaction time before
the variables were winsorized). The ANOVA with reaction time as the dependent
variable revealed the same main effects and interactions as the processing costs analysis.
A main effect of consistency was found (F(1, 39) = 53.251, p < .000, ηp2 = .577 ) with
consistent conditions (m = 956.67 ms) significantly faster than inconsistent conditions (m
= 1058.63 ms). A main effect of task (F(1, 39) = 4.350, p = .044, ηp2 = .100) revealed that
the alone conditions (m = 974.78 ms) were significantly faster than dual task conditions
(m = 1040.53 ms). No significant perspective effect was found (F(1,41) = .043, p < .837,
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ηp2 = .001). Two significant interactions were found; task by perspective (F(1, 39) = 7.114,
p = .011, ηp2 = .154) and perspective by consistency (F(1, 39) = 15.908, p < .000, ηp2
= .290). Thus, before interpreting the main effects, the interactions were examined
further. No significant interaction was found between task and consistency (F(1, 39) =
2.662, p = .111, ηp2 = .064). See Figure 6 for results by each level.

Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for L-1 VP task: Reaction Times after data were Winsorized

N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Other Consistent

40

891.95

192.85

587.00

1303.90

Other Inconsistent

40

1105.05

286.26

497.00

1786.40

Self Consistent

40

927.58

230.36

490.00

1368.10

Self Inconsistent

40

974.52

308.58

471.00

1682.40

Other Consistent

40

953.29

296.57

548.00

1710.30

Other Inconsistent

40

1087.73

290.77

483.00

1825.00

Self Consistent

40

1053.88

309.58

639.00

1815.50

Self Inconsistent

40

1067.24

251.54

664.00

1600.70

Alone

Dual
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Figure. 6. Reaction time for each condition. The error bars are confidence intervals
calculated with the Loftus and Masson (1994) formula (CI, ± 42.723). The curved
brackets show the egocentric interference, which is indicated by the faster reaction times
for the Consistent compared to the Inconsistent conditions for the Other perspective.

The interaction between task and perspective was examined further with a post
hoc pairwise contrast. The Self perspective was significantly faster for the Alone (m =
951.05 ms) compared to the Dual task condition (m = 1060.56 ms). No other pairwise
contrasts were significant. See Figure 7 for an illustration of the interaction. Table 9
provides descriptive statistics and confidence intervals for this contrast.
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Figure. 7. Line graph of task by perspective interaction for reaction time. A significant
contrast was found between Alone and Dual task conditions for Self perspective.

Table 9
Task by Perspective Interaction with Reaction Time as the Dependent Variable
95% Confidence Intervals (CI)
Condition

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Other

998.50

36.22

951.58

1045.41

Self

951.05

41.14

904.13

997.97

1020.51
1060.56

42.89
40.07

973.59
1013.64

1067.42
1107.47

Alone

Dual
Other
Self

Note. Loftus and Masson (1994) formula used to calculate the CI’s (± 42.723). The only
significant contrast is between the alone and dual task condition for self perspective.
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The pairwise post hoc comparison between consistency and perspective revealed
a significant consistency effect for Other perspective (consistent = 922.62 ms;
inconsistent = 1096.34 ms) but not for Self perspective (Figure 8). That is, when
participants responded to conditions being asked to judge the Other perspective (i.e., the
agent’s perspective), they were significantly faster on Consistent conditions (i.e., when
the participant’s and agent’s perspectives matched, m= 958.15 ms) compared to
Inconsistent conditions (i.e., when the participant’s and agent’s perspective did not match,
m= 1262.69 ms). There was no consistent effect for the self perspective conditions.
Table 10 provides the descriptive statistics and confidence intervals for these pairwise
contrasts.

Table 10
Perspective by Consistency Interaction with Reaction Time as the Dependent Variable
95% Confidence Intervals (CI)
Condition

Mean

Std. Error

Lower Bound

Upper Bound

Consistent

922.62

31.98

857.93

987.30

Inconsistent

1096.39

39.77

1015.94

1176.83

Consistent

990.73

40.04

909.74

1071.71

Inconsistent

1020.88

38.72

942.57

1099.19

Other

Self

Note. Loftus and Masson (1994) CI ± 51.499. The only significant pairwise contrast for
between consistent and inconsistent for the other perspective.
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Figure. 8. Line Graph of the Perspective by Consistency Interaction for Reaction Time
Notes: The significant contrast was between the Consistent and Inconsistent conditions
for the Other perspective.

Predicted versus Measured
Reaction Time
Researchers have developed algebraic functions to estimate older adult reaction
time based on young adult data. To consider how the results of the current sample
compare to predicted reaction times based on such functions, young adult reaction times
from a previous study (Qureshi, 2008) utilizing a similar level-1 visual perspective taking
task was entered into a formula as described by Verhaeghen (2006). In consideration of
the task demands of level-1 visual perspective taking, a formula for spatial stimuli was
employed. See Table 11 for predicted reaction times for older adults based on a young
adult sample as well as the actual reaction times demonstrated by the current older adult
sample.
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Table 11
Predicted Older Adult Reaction Time versus Data Collected in the Current Sample
Young
adults

Predicted
older adults

Current
sample

Other consistent

595

920

970

Other inconsistent

780

1290

1360

Self consistent

620

970

975

Self inconsistent

770

1270

1120

Other consistent

775

1280

1060

Other inconsistent

1450

2630

1360

Self consistent

775

1280

1160

Self inconsistent

1200

2130

1260

Alone

Dual

Note. The young adult reaction times were from Qureshi (2008). The predicted reaction
times were based on Verhaeghen’s (2006) formula for spatial tasks: older adult reaction
times = 2*young adult reaction times-270.
Gender Analysis
Using reaction time as the dependent variable, the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 mixed-design
ANOVA with consistency (consistent versus inconsistent), perspective (self versus other),
and task (alone versus dual) as the within subject factors and gender (male versus female)
as the between-subject factor revealed an overall gender effect (F(1, 38) = 5.495, p = .024,
d = .73). Males were significantly faster (m = 926.24 ms, SE = 47.931) than females (m
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= 1081.31 ms, SE = 45.591). No significant gender interactions were found. The mixeddesign ANOVA using processing cost as the dependent variable did not reveal any
significant gender effects. That is, in contrast to the reaction time analysis, processing
cost did not reveal an overall gender effect (F(1, 38) = 1.962, p = .169).
In an Older Adult Sample, how does Spatial and Verbal
Working Memory Contribute to Theory of Mind?
Prior to reporting the results of the hierarchical regression analyses, a description
of the theory of mind story task and the measures of working memory follows. The
theory of mind story task had a mean of 15.48 (out of a 20 points possible) with a
standard deviation of 2.54. There were three outliers with low scores that were
disconnected from the rest of the distribution. All analyses were conducted with the full
sample; however, I examined the mean and standard deviation of the theory of mind story
task with these three outliers dropped to examine central tendency and spread for the
majority of the sample. The mean and standard deviation with the three outliers dropped
were 16.03 and 1.75 respectively, indicating that the variance for the majority of the
distribution was small. The current sample means and standard deviation for the digit
span forward, backward, and sequence were 10.21 (2.28), 8.48 (1.85), and 8.86 (1.83)
respectively. The mean of the total digit span was 27.55 with a standard deviation of
4.91. The mean symbol span score for current study was 21.52 with a standard deviation
of 5.51. See Table 12 for a summary of descriptive statistics for the theory of mind story
task and the working memory measures.
A hierarchical regression analysis examined if spatial working memory explained
variance in the theory of mind story task above and beyond verbal working memory.
Verbal working memory was added in the first step, which produced a significant model
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(F(1, 40) = 5.867, p = .02, R2 = .128). At the second step spatial working memory was
added, which produced an overall statistically significantly model, F(2, 39) = 3.539, p
= .039. The R2 change after adding spatial working memory was .026, which was not
statistically significant (F change = 1.184, p = .283), providing an overall R2 of .154.

Table 12
Descriptive Statistics for Theory of Mind Task and Working Memory Measures

N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Theory of mind

42

15.48

2.54

8

20

Control stories

42

16.3

2.56

11

20

42

27.55

4.91

18

40

Digit span forward

42

10.21

2.28

6

16

Digit span backward

42

8.48

1.85

5

14

Digit span sequence

42

8.86

1.83

5

12

42

21.52

5.51

9

33

SST

Digit span total

Symbol span

Note. SST = Strange stories Task, which includes theory of mind stories and control
stories; SD = standard deviation; Digit span is a measure of verbal working memory from
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV and symbol span is a measure of visual
working memory from the Wechsler Memory Scale-IV.
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In an Older Adult Sample, how does Spatial and Verbal
Working Memory Contribute to Level-1
Visual Perspective Taking?
Two hierarchical regression analyses examined if verbal working memory
explained variance in the level-1 visual perspective taking task above and beyond spatial
working memory. For the first regression, processing costs for the alone task was entered
as the outcome variable. The first step in the analysis revealed that spatial working
memory (as measured by Digit Span total) did not contribute significantly to the model,
F(1, 39) = 3.47, p = .07. At the second step verbal working memory was added, which did
not contribute to the model significantly (F(2, 38) = 1.843, p = .172). The R2 change after
adding verbal working memory was not significant (R2 change .088, F change = .284, p
= .597) giving an overall R2 of .088.
For the second regression, processing costs for the dual task was entered as the
outcome variable. Spatial working memory was again entered in the first step, F(1, 39) =
2.064, p = .159). Verbal working memory was added in the second step, which did not
contribute to the model significantly (F(2, 39) = 1.631, p = .209). The R2 change after
adding verbal working memory was not significant (R2 change = .029, F change = 1.188,
p = .283) providing an overall R2 of .079.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The current study investigated mental state understanding during aging with two
primary goals. First, I set out to examine if there is evidence of automatic and
cognitively efficient processes involved in mental state understanding in an older adult
sample. My second goal was to investigate how verbal and spatial working memory
mediates performance in mental state understanding in older adults. An aging in place
sample was obtained with the goal of increasing the generalizability of the findings to the
larger population of older adults (Black, 2008). The first section of the current chapter
begins with a discussion of the results in context with my first research question. The
second section of the current chapter presents the results associated with my second and
third research questions followed by a discussion of the conclusions and implications of
results in context of the broader literature. Finally, I finish with suggestions for future
research and discuss the limitations of the current study. Prior to discussing the results,
the following is a summary of my three research questions and the associated hypotheses.
Q1

Is there evidence of cognitively efficient processes in a level-1 visual
perspective taking task in an older adult sample?

H1

Older adults will perform significantly slower and/or more error prone
when their perspective differs from that of the avatars perspective when
being asked to judge other perspective on the level-1 perspective taking
task (i.e., indicating egocentric bias).

H2

Older adults will perform significantly slower and/or more error prone
when their perspective differs from that of the avatars perspective when
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being asked to judge self perspective on the level-1 perspective taking task
(i.e., indicating altercentric bias).
H3

In regards to examining whether executive function is involved in selection
processes, the dual-task trials will result in larger processing costs in
consistent and inconsistent trials with disproportionately larger costs in the
inconsistent trials for older adults.

H4

In regards to examining whether executive function is involved in
calculation processes, dual-task trials will result in a significantly larger
altercentric effect for older adults compared to alone trials. If this result is
confirmed, then this would suggest that calculation of the other
perspective does not rely on executive function processes.

Q2

In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working memory
contribute to theory of mind?

H5

Verbal working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance
on a theory of mind story task compared to spatial working memory.

Q3

In an older adult sample, how does verbal and spatial working memory
contribute to level-1 visual perspective taking?

H6

Spatial working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance
on a level-1 visual perspective taking task compared to verbal working
memory.
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking
The first research question was, “Is there evidence of cognitively efficient

processes in a level-1 visual perspective taking task in an older adult sample?”
Answering this question will be accomplished by considering the entire set of results for
the level-1 visual perspective taking task. Thus, the results testing each of my first four
hypotheses are considered individually. The current study used a level-1 visual
perspective taking task where participants made either self or other judgments regarding
the number of red dots that were visible on the computer screen. In some conditions, the
perspective of the participant and the perspective of the agent (i.e., a computer generated
avatar) did not match; these were inconsistent trials. In other conditions, the perspective
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of the participant and the agent did match; these were consistent trials. Thus, a
consistency effect tested the difference between inconsistent and consistent perspectives
(i.e., mismatched versus matched respectively). A perspective effect was tested by
comparing the self and other perspectives. Finally, participants completed the level-1
visual perspective taking task alone and as a dual task with a secondary inhibition task.
The difference between the alone and dual task conditions tested for a task effect. The
purpose of including the dual task was to examine the impact of inhibition demands on
level-1 visual perspective taking. The critical prediction for the dual task was a
hypothesized interaction between task and consistency such that the dual task would
result in a significantly larger consistency effect compared to the alone task. This
interaction would suggest that inhibitory aspects of executive functioning is not involved
when older adults calculate the agent’s perspective; thus, providing evidence of
cognitively efficient processes in mental state understanding during aging.
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of consistency, however, a significant
interaction between consistency and perspective was found; thus, follow-up analysis was
necessary before the consistency effect could be interpreted. A pairwise contrast
indicated that the consistency effect was significant when participants judged the agent’s
perspective (i.e., other condition) but no consistency effect was found when participants
judged their own perspective (i.e., self conditions). Thus, the first hypothesis examining
if older adults are prone to egocentric bias was supported. That is, when participants
were asked to judge the perspective of the agent, they were significantly slower when
their own perspective did not match (i.e., inconsistent) compared to when their
perspective did match the agent’s perspective (i.e., consistent). Analysis using
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processing costs (i.e., reaction time divided by the proportion of correct responses), as
well as reaction time alone, resulted in the same outcome. To reiterate, these results
indicate that older adults are prone to egocentric interference as indicated by the
significantly larger processing costs and slower reaction time for inconsistent compared
to consistent trials for other perspective.
The second hypothesis examined if there was evidence of altercentric interference
effects in an older adult sample. As stated above, the follow-up analysis examining the
interaction between consistency and perspective indicated that there was no consistency
effect for self trials. This is to say, when participants judged their own perspective there
were no statistically significant interference effects (i.e., difference between inconsistent
and consistent conditions) when the agents’ perspective differed from their own.
In regards to examining if inhibitory control is involved in selection processes
(i.e., when participants make a response selection), I predicted that dual-task trials would
result in larger processing costs (i.e., slower reaction times and higher error rates) for
both consistent and inconsistent conditions with disproportionately larger costs in the
inconsistent trials. This hypothesis would have been supported by a significant task by
consistency interaction; however, this hypothesis was not supported in the current study.
I hypothesized that dual-task trials would result in larger altercentric interference effects
compared to the alone trials; however, no altercentric effects were found in either alone
or dual-task conditions. Thus, the forth hypothesis was not supported.
Finally, a significant interaction between task and perspective was found. No a
priori hypothesis for made for this interaction. Follow-up analysis indicated that the self
perspective was significantly slower for the dual task compared to the alone task;
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whereas, no significant difference was found for the other perspective. In other words,
when participants judged their own perspective they were significantly slower and more
error prone in the dual-task trials compared to the alone trials. There were no theoretical
reasons to predict a significant task by perspective interaction.
Egocentric Interference
The significant consistency effect when participants judged the agent’s
perspective (i.e., Other perspective) provides evidence that older adults are prone to
egocentric interference. Egocentric bias, that is, bias due to self-knowledge interfering
with the accurate assessment of another individual or perspective, have been observed
from the earliest stages of development (Bjorklund & Green, 1992; Carlson & Moses,
2001; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). For example, 14 month olds responded egocentrically
when infants watched an experimenter either express enjoyment or disgust after taking a
food; instead of predicting which food the experimenter would prefer (based on the
enjoyment or disgust reactions of the experimenter), the 14 old month infants responded
egocentrically (that is, based on their own preferences, Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997).
In the preschool years, errors that children make in false belief tasks tend to be
systematic egocentric errors (e.g., Doherty & Wimmer, 2005). In a false belief task
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983), children see a character, Sally, place an object in a round box
and then leave the room. A different character, Ann, transfers the object from its original
box into a different square box. When Sally returns, participants are asked where Sally
will look for the object. Thus, in the Sally-and-Anne-task, participants must inhibit their
knowledge of where the object is located (which has been moved from a previous
location) to correctly identify where Sally thinks the object is located (which is a false-
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belief). Preschool children give responses to this task and variations of this task from the
knowledge of their own perspective instead of the point of view of the agent, which is
what is being asked of them (Cassidy, 1998; Saltmarsh, Mitchell, & Robinson, 1995)
When children’s inhibitory control improves they are more likely to inhibit their
own perspective and explicitly acknowledge that the other agent has a false belief (Leslie
et al., 2004). The ability to set aside one’s own knowledge is considered one of the
cognitive requirements to passing false belief tasks (Birch & Bloom, 2007; Carlson &
Moses, 2001; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998). In fact, children’s performance on perspectivetaking tasks has been shown to correlate with false belief tasks (Doherty & Wimmer,
2005; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009; Perner & Leekam, 2008; Wimmer & Doherty,
2011). Perner and Roessler (2012) discussed that to pass a false belief task children must
be able to switch between their own perspective and that of an agent’s. There is also
evidence beyond false belief tasks that children in general formulate ideas about others
using their own egocentric perspective (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, & Andrews, 1989;
Mossler, Marvin, & Greenberg, 1976; Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994).
Even though children are capable of switching between self and other
perspectives after the age of 4, adults continue to make egocentric errors (Epley et al.,
2004; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998) in addition to errors in perspective taking tasks
(Keysar, 1994). For instance, after a series of experiments, Epley, Keysar, Van Boven,
and Gilovich (2004) concluded that adults make judgments regarding other peoples’
perspectives by making serial adjustments from their own egocentric bias. That is, when
considering someone else’s perspective, participants start with their egocentric bias as an
anchor and make adjustments from this point of view.
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There is evidence that suggests that even though adults are prone to egocentric
perspectives they are better than children at correcting away from their initial egocentric
perspective (Epley et al., 2004). Nevertheless, several bodies of literature suggest that a
pervasive cognitive bias toward egocentrism persists into adulthood and influences a
wide range of social judgments (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman,
Cassidy, & Baron, 2003). The current study provides evidence that older adults
continue to be prone to egocentric interference.
At least one study examined visual perspective taking across the adult lifespan.
Inagaki et al. (2002) examined young adult (m = 22.2 years old), middle-aged (m = 45.8
years old), and older adult (m = 74.6 years old) performance on two variations of
Piaget’s Three Mountain Task (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). Participants viewed two cubes
sitting on a two by two grid. In one variation of the task, participants were required to
mentally rotate the grid and indicate where the cubes would be located after the grid was
rotated. In the other variation, participants were required to imagine what their
perspective would be if they moved to a different location. The former task measured
the participant’s ability to mentally rotate an image (i.e., object-mental rotation) whereas
the latter task measured participant’s ability to represent a different perspective (i.e.,
subject-mental rotation). Results indicated that older adults made more egocentric errors
than young adults and middle-aged adults on the subject-mental rotation but not the
object-mental rotation task. Inagaki et al. (2002) interpreted these results to suggest that
older adults had more difficulty with imagining another individual’s perspective but
demonstrated preserved object rotation ability. In the current study no age comparisons
can be made; however, it is interesting to consider the evidence from Inagaki et al.’s
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(2002) study that older adults demonstrated an increase in egocentric errors compared to
young and middle-aged adults when they were asked to take a different perspective but
not when they were asked to mentally rotate an object.
Altercentric Interference
The results from the current study did not find evidence of altercentric
interference effects in older adults. Thus, there is no evidence present that older adults
automatically judged the agent’s perspective. These results sit in direct contrast to three
studies using young adult participants and one study with 6, 8 and 10 year old children as
participants. To be clear, Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Scott (2010) were
the first to examine level-1 perspective taking in adults and found that participants were
significantly slower when judging self perspective when the agent’s perspective did not
match their own. In a study investigating level-1 perspective taking in adults and
children aged 6 to 10 years old, results indicated adults were overall faster but were not
better at reducing irrelevant perspective intrusions compared to the children (Surtees &
Apperly, 2012); thus, there were no age-related differences in regards to egocentric and
altercentric effects. In contrast, the results from the current study found no evidence that
older adults automatically process the perspective of the agent when they are being asked
to judge their own perspective.
While it is important to be cautious about what can be extrapolated from the
absence of evidence, it is worthwhile to consider possible explanations regarding the lack
of altercentric interference effects in older adults. For one, it is possible that the
automatic and cognitively efficient system declines with age. The second possibility is
that there are limits to the automatic system and the cognitive capacity of older adults
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exceeds these limits. Lastly, it is possible that the model as conceptualized by Apperly
and colleagues overestimated the degree to which the automatic processes are free of
executive control. These possibilities are considered in turn.
First, one possible explanation is that automatic cognitive processes associated
with mental state understanding decline with age. That is, the results of the current study
are in direct opposition to the findings of three previous studies (with young adult
samples and six to ten year old children) that suggest that level-1 visual perspective
taking involve cognitively efficient and automatic processes. Thus, it is possible that the
cognitively efficient system present in children and young adults deteriorates during the
aging process. This offers an explanation for the research that suggests mental state
understanding declines with age above and beyond domain-general cognitive processes.
For example, in a review of theory of mind during aging, Moran (2013) concluded that
there is evidence of age-related decline associated with mental state understanding that is
at least partially independent of general cognitive decline.
Several authors have suggested that moving away from egocentric bias requires
cognitive effort. When considering the evidence in the current study that older adults
are prone to egocentric interference but not to interference from other’s perspectives, it
may be the case that during aging, taking another individual’s perspective requires more
cognitive effort compared to young adults. For example, studies have found age-related
decline in mental state stories but not in control stories (i.e., the control stories were not
negatively correlated with age but the mental state stories were). This differential
performance between theory of mind and control stories suggest that age-related
impairments are specifically due to difficulties with making mental state attributions and
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not simply due to general cognitive decline (Charlton et al., 2009; Sullivan & Ruffman,
2004). Thus, it is possible that an age-related impairment in cognitively efficient
mechanisms for mental state understanding may be contributing to the age-related
deficits in theory of mind tasks. That is, the evidence that suggests older adults
demonstrate mental state understanding decline that is not fully explained by general
cognitive decline (i.e., domain-general decline) might be partially due to a loss of
cognitively efficient processing for representing other’s mental states during the aging
process.
The suggestion that automatic processes in mental state understanding may
decline with age diverges from the literature that suggests that implicit processes are less
likely to decline compared to resources associated with high cognitive control (e.g.,
Zelazo & Craik, 2004). For instance, there is evidence that implicit memory is stable
during the aging process (Ballesteros & Reales, 2004). Fleischman, Wilson, Gabrieli,
Bienias, and Bennett (2004) conducted a longitudinal study and found that explicit
memory declined over 4 years and implicit memory remained stable. Other cognitive
domains that have been shown to demonstrate resilience to age-related change are
implicit learning (Gaillard, Destrebecqz, Michiels, & Cleeremans, 2009) and implicit
attitudes and stereotypes (Hummert, Gartska, O’Brien, Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002).
The differential age-related decline between implicit and explicit processes fits
with neuropsychological research that suggests that implicit and explicit memory are
disassociated (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). Therefore, the results from the current study
are particularly striking because of the contrast to evidence that implicit processes are
relatively impervious to age-related decline. It should be emphasized that the level-1
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visual perspective taking task employed in the current study is not an implicit task. The
task requires an explicit response and the task demands a relatively high degree of effort
and attention on the part of the participants to complete the task. Recall that in order to
make a response, participants must first keep in mind the perspective (i.e., self or other)
and the number shown on the screen, and then subsequently make a selection (i.e., an
explicit decision) regarding the number of dots that can be viewed from the perspective
that was indicated to them. In this task, implicit perspective taking is inferred by
comparing the consistent to inconsistent perspectives. It should be stressed, however,
that when participants are required to give their own perspective (i.e., self conditions)
they are not required to explicitly judge the agent’s perspective. Therefore, comparing
the difference in reaction times between consistent and inconsistent trials represents a
good test for implicit perspective taking. Thus, if it is indeed the case that a cognitively
efficient and automatic system for representing other’s mental states declines with age,
then this rests in opposition to the evidence that implicit cognitive processes in other
domains are resistant to age-related decline.
Earlier I suggested that there are three points of view regarding the lack of
evidence of altercentric interference in the current older adult sample. First, I argued that
the automatic and efficient cognitive processes associated with mental state
understanding might actually be in decline with age. The second possibility is that the
cognitively efficient mechanism underlying level-1 visual perspective taking is
constrained by limits, which older adults do not meet. The conceptualization of limits of
cognitive efficiency is built around the dual route model of mental state understanding.
In Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) framework, the dual route model is based on the
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premise of two discrete systems that work in parallel; one system is characterized by fast
and automatic processing, while the other system is slow and cognitively demanding. If
there are distinct systems for understanding mental states, then Apperly (2010) contends
that there must be limits to the cognitively efficient module. That is, in order for the dual
route approach to be a useful theory, the model must make clear the limits of these
independent systems. Moreover, the argument is made that understanding the limits of
each system is necessary to avoid the risk of a circular description of a dual route model
of mental state understanding. One limit, according to Apperly and colleagues, on the
cognitive efficient system is that it can support level-1 visual perspectives only and not
level-2 visual perspectives or belief reasoning (Apperly, 2010; Apperly, Riggs, Simpson,
Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010). Surtees and Apperly (2012)
suggested that cognitive efficiency in level-1 perspective taking is likely limited to what a
person can see versus how something is seen demonstrating another limit of the efficient
system.
Related to the limits of cognitive efficiency, Apperly considers the importance of
processing speed. He points out that for mental state understanding to be successfully
employed in social interactions it must occur fast enough. That is, the utility of social
cognition for the facilitation of social interaction is that information processing must
occur quick enough to be put to use. It is interesting to consider that slower processing
speed in older adults might interrupt the ability of perspective taking to occur
automatically. To be precise, if cognitive efficiency is limited by processing speed, then
it is possible that older adult processing speed exceeds this limit. The hypothesis that the
cognitive efficient system is limited by speed of processing requires further investigation.
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Finally, an additional consideration is that the model as conceptualized by
Apperly and colleagues overestimated the degree to which the automatic processes are
free of executive resources. On the surface this appears to challenge the very argument
of an automatic system; however, it is possible that the cognitively efficient system might
at least involve some low-level executive resources. Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, and Dux
(2012) designed a study to test if implicit theory of mind is influenced by executive
control. Recall that the premise of a dual task design is to examine if one process
(measured by a secondary task) interrupts a primary task. Schneider et al. (2012) found
that implicit theory of mind (as measured by eye movement while participants watched a
false belief scene) was disrupted under the dual task conditions suggesting that even
implicit mental state representation involves some degree of executive resources. In
terms of reconciling Schneider et al.’s results with the current study, several details must
be pointed out. The significant task by perspective interaction in the current study
indicated that the dual task was significantly more difficult compared to the alone task
when older adults took their own perspective but not when they took the agent’s
perspective. Although it is unclear why the dual task appeared to increase cognitive load
for self trials, the results from the current study suggest that the dual task did not increase
cognitive load when participants made judgments based on the other perspective. This
seems to indicate that taking another perspective does not involve inhibitory processes;
however, the lack of altercentric interference effects in the current study suggests that
taking the agent’s perspective was not automatic for older adults. These two findings
appear to be contradictory; however, it is possible that these seemingly divergent results
are a consequence of the cognitively efficient system involving some low-level executive
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resources. If the cognitively efficient system is not completely free from executive
control, then older adults may not show evidence of the automatic processing due to their
reduced executive resources. In other words, the reduced executive functioning of older
adults may prevent the cognitively efficient system from being deployed. Alternatively,
if the secondary task in the current study was not sufficiently difficult, then the executive
resources may have not been taxed to a large enough degree to significantly impact the
dual task. It is important to re-emphasize that no definitive conclusions can be made
regarding the lack of altercentric effects in the current study. This is to say, it should be
stressed that the null finding cannot be accepted as true and the disparate results require
further investigation.
In considering the argument that the cognitive efficient system may recruit some
low-level executive resources, then this may explain the dissimilar results of Schneider et
al. (2012) and Qureshi et al. (2010). To review, in contrast to the results of Schneider et
al. (2012), Qureshi et al.’s (2010) dual task did not disrupt automatic perspective taking.
However, these two studies used different primary and secondary tasks. Schneider et
al.’s (2012) primary task was tapping implicit theory of mind and verbal working
memory was required for the secondary task. Qureshi et al.’s (2010) primary task
required level-1 visual perspective taking and inhibitory control was required for the
secondary task. The former study found evidence of disruption of an implicit theory of
mind task whereas the latter study did not find evidence of disruption of implicit level-1
visual perspective taking. Two considerations come to mind when contrasting the results
and task demands of these two studies. For one, several decades of evidence have
demonstrated a strong relationship between theory of mind and verbal working memory.
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Secondly, little is known about the task demands of the level-1 visual perpective taking.
In fact, the current study was the first to examine the contribution of working memory on
the level-1 visual perspective taking task developed by Samson et al. (2010). The dual
task study designed by Qureshi et al. (2010) and the current study, are the only two
studies that have examined how inhibition impacts level-1 visual perspective taking.
Qureshi et al. (2010) found inhibition control did not interrupt automatic processes. The
current study, however, did not find evidence of automatic processes in older adults; thus,
inhibitory control in the current study is moot.
It seems plausible that these two abilities, implicit theory of mind and level-1
visual perspective taking, represented different degrees of cognitively efficient processes.
In fact, as discussed earlier, Apperly (2010) suggested that level-1 but not level-2 visual
perspective taking is cognitively efficient. Together, the results from Schneider et al.
(2012) and Qureshi et al. (2010) suggest that implicit theory of mind may draw on
working memory aspects of executive control while level-1 visual perspective taking
involves fewer executive resources. However, there is not currently enough evidence to
rule out the possibility that the cognitively efficient system related to level-1 visual
perspective is completely free from executive resources. Finally, it also cannot be ruled
out that the reason why older adults did not automatically process another agent’s
perspective is because of their decreased inhibition control compared to young adults.
The Role of Inhibition Control on
Selection and Calculation
The third and forth hypotheses tested the effect of adding a secondary task to the
primary level-1 perspective taking task. The secondary task recruited executive
functioning resources, which was intended to specifically require inhibition control.
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Thus, these hypotheses examined the role of inhibitory processes in level-1 perspective
taking.
The third hypothesis investigated the role of inhibition during selection processes
under the premise that inhibition is required when participants need to select between two
possible perspectives (i.e., self or other perspective). In other words, in order to select the
correct perspective, the alternate perspective would need to be inhibited. The task by
consistency interaction tested the third hypothesis, with the prediction that inhibitory
resources would be involved in selection processes. This hypothesis was grounded in the
prediction that both alone and dual-task conditions would result in a consistency effect
(i.e., inconsistent > consistent) with a significantly larger effect for inconsistent trials in
the dual task compared to the alone condition; however no significant task by consistency
interaction was found in the current study. Therefore, the current study provided no
evidence regarding the role of inhibition during selection processes.
The final hypothesis relating to the level-1 visual perspective taking task tested
the role of inhibition control on calculation processes. I hypothesized that participants
would demonstrate a larger altercentric effect for the dual task compared to the alone
condition. This hypothesis was grounded in the logic of a dual task design, which
suggests that a secondary task will preclude a process involved in a primary task if the
two tasks involve the same cognitive resources. In the case of the current study, if
inhibition control were involved in the cognitive mechanisms underling the altercentric
effect, then the secondary task would obviate the altercentric interference. As indicated
by the significant interaction between consistency and perspective, however, no
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altercentric effect was found in the current study. Therefore, the forth hypothesis was
not supported.
Apperly (2010) suggested that since both children and adults are prone to making
judgments about others based on their own perspectives (i.e., egocentric biases), this
suggests that moving away from such biases requires cognitive effort. Based on the
results from the current study, however, the role of inhibition control is unclear. In the
current study, older adults were prone to egocentric interference, which is consistent with
research suggesting that adults and children are prone to egocentric bias. On the other
hand, the egocentric interference was not larger for the dual task condition, therefore
there is no evidence regarding the role of executive functioning in terms of inhibition
impacting the interference. In addition, no altercentric interference was found, thus the
role of inhibition on automatic processing of other’s perspectives could not be directly
analyzed. To be clear, both of the hypotheses examining the role of inhibition were not
supported; as a consequence, no inferences can be made regarding the role of inhibitory
control aspects of executive functioning in level-1 visual perspective taking.
Even though the role of executive functioning when taking the agent’s perspective
could not be directly assessed, there is some evidence in the current study that taking
another individuals’ perspective does require cognitive effort for older adults. The
follow-up analysis examining the significant interaction between perspective (i.e., self
versus other) and task (i.e., alone versus dual) indicated that the dual task was
significantly slower for the self perspective but there was no difference between the alone
(999 ms) and dual-task conditions (1021 ms) for the other perspective. This suggests that
taking the agent’s perspective was equally challenging for older adults in the alone and
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the dual task conditions, which may be the result of the other perspective being effortful
for older adults to process. This is to say that for the current sample, it appears the other
perspective was always effortful (i.e., equally effortful for both the alone and dual-task
trials), whereas taking the self perspective was effortful for the dual task but not for the
alone condition.
Gender Differences
When reaction time was used as dependent variable results indicated that males
were overall faster than females on the level-1 visual perspective taking task. The effect
size (d =. 73) indicated that the gender effect of reaction time was moderate to large in
magnitude (Cohen, 1988). No significant gender interactions were found, indicating that
males and females did not differ in the relative performance on egocentric or altercentric
interference effects. In addition, no differential gender differences were found for alone
or dual-task conditions. Studies examining gender differences in reaction time
consistently demonstrate that males respond significantly faster compared to females (e.g.,
Adam et al., 1999; Der & Deary, 2006). In addition to an overall reaction time advantage,
males tend to demonstrate the greatest advantage on visual compared to auditory tasks
(Spierer, Petersen, Duffy, Corcoran, & Rawls-Martin, 2010). Thus, the moderate to large
gender effect in the current study might be partially due to the visual component of the
perspective taking task.
The analysis using processing costs as the dependent variable did not reveal any
gender effects. When considering that processing costs are calculated by dividing
reaction time by the percent of correct trials, it appears that while males were faster than
females, they were not more accurate than females. Previous research suggests that
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gender differences in reaction time are partially a consequence of a speed-accuracy
tradeoff; males are faster than females but the quicker speed comes with a cost of males
being more error prone (Reimers & Maylor, 2006). In line with the speed-accuracy
tradeoff, the results of the current study suggest that while males had the tendency to be
faster than females, gender difference were diminished when accuracy was accounted for.
Summary
In summary, the main effect for consistency cannot be interpreted without first
examining the significant interaction between consistency and perspective. Follow-up
analyses indicated that there was a significant consistency effect for other but not for self
conditions. Therefore, the current study found evidence that older adults were prone to
egocentric but not altercentric interference effects. Thus, support for the first hypothesis
was found but no evidence was found for the second hypothesis.
Following the logic of Qureshi et al. (2010), I differentiated between selection and
calculation processes during the perspective taking task. The third hypothesis examined
the role of inhibitory processes in selection processes, which was not supported as no
interaction was found between task and consistency. This hypothesis would have been
supported if both consistent and inconsistent conditions were slower for the dual task
with inconsistent conditions disproportionately impacted. In regards to the forth
hypothesis, which examined if executive functioning is involved in calculation processes
(i.e., before a response is made), I hypothesized that dual-task trials would result in larger
altercentric interference effects compared to the alone trials; however, the significant
interaction between perspective and consistency indicated that no altercentric effect was
found. Furthermore, an altercentric effect was not found in the alone or the dual-task
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conditions (as would have been indicated by a three-way interaction between perspective,
consistency, and task). Consequently, the forth hypothesis was not supported.
In regards to answering the first research question, the current study failed to find
evidence of cognitively efficient processes in level-1 perspective taking in an older adult
sample. The lack of evidence of older adults automatically processing the agent’s
perspective was considered from three viewpoints. First, it is possible that cognitively
efficient perspective taking declines with age, which offers an explanation for the
research that suggests that mental state understanding declines above and beyond
domain-general cognitive processes. Second, Apperly (2010) asserted that one of the
requisites of cognitive efficiency must be that there are limits to the capacity of the
system; I suggested that age-related deficits in processing speed might impede cognitive
efficiency in older adults. Finally, I considered the possibility that the automatic and
cognitively efficient system may not be completely free from inhibition control. At this
time, the veracity of these three hypotheses remains unknown.
Theory of Mind, Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking,
and Working Memory
Prior to discussing the results of the hierarchical regression, I will first discuss the
current sample’s performance on the working memory measures. Digit span from the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–IV and symbol span from the Wechsler Memory
Scale–IV were used as measures of verbal and spatial working memory respectively. The
current sample means and standard deviations on the digit span forward, backward, and
sequence were almost identical to a young adult sample in another study (n = 1600;
Salthouse & Saklofske, 2010). The current sample means and standard deviation were
10.21 (2.28), 8.48 (1.85), and 8.86 (1.83) respectively. Salthouse and Saklofske (2010)
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reported the following means and standard deviations for a young adult sample: 10.5
(2.4), 8.8 (2.5), and 8.7 (2.3) respectively. Furthermore, the mean symbol span score for
current study was 21.52 with a standard deviation of 5.51, which is comparable to the
mean of 21.04 and standard deviation of 8.7 from a large-scale study (n = 1399) of adults
aged 16-90 years old (Salthouse, 2009b). As previously discussed in chapter two, older
adults typically demonstrate greater variance compared to young adults; however, the
current sample preformed equivalent to young adult samples on the working memory
measures in terms of central tendency and variance.
Theory of Mind and Working
Memory
H5

Verbal working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance
on a theory of mind story task compared to spatial working memory.
The hierarchical regression analysis indicated that my fifth hypothesis was

supported. That is, verbal working memory contributed to theory of mind story
performance above and beyond spatial working memory. Although verbal working
memory contributed significantly to the model, only 12.8% of the theory of mind
variance was explained. Spatial working memory did not contribute significantly to the
model when it was added at the second step.
Overall, the model including both verbal and spatial working memory explained
15.4% of the variance. These results suggest that although verbal working memory does
impact older adult theory of mind performance, most of the variance was not accounted
for. Before considering other factors that may contribute to individual differences in
theory of mind performance in older adults, it should be noted that the research
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examining the impact of working memory on age-related theory of mind declines to date
has been equivocal.
McKinnon and Moscovitch (2007) found that older adults performed significantly
worse than young adults on second order theory of mind but not first order theory of
mind tasks. The authors analyzed the older adult error rates and found almost 70% were
due their failure of considering multiple pieces of information. Additionally, participants
made more errors on a theory of mind task when concurrently performing a secondary
working memory task (i.e., a dual task) compared to when the theory of mind task was
performed alone. The error rate analysis and dual task results from this study both
suggest that theory of mind performance is mediated by working memory during aging.
In contrast, in a study that manipulated working memory demands on two theory
of mind tasks, Sullivan and Ruffman (2004) found that older adults (m= 73 years old)
performed significantly worse than younger adults on both tasks; that is, older adults still
showed theory of mind impairments even when working memory demands were reduced.
Based on these results, Sullivan and Ruffman argued that theory of mind abilities decline
in older adults independent of working memory and general cognitive abilities. Other
studies have also found that older adults perform worse on both theory of mind and
control stories (German & Hehman, 2006; Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007), which
suggests that observed performance declines are not specifically associated with
understanding mental states but are instead associated with cognitive functioning.
In addition to working memory, previous research has demonstrated that
inhibition control plays a role in mental state understanding in older adults (e.g., Duval et
al., 2011; Charlton et al., 2009). German and Hehman (2006) found that older adult
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performance on reasoning about other’s beliefs correlated with inhibitory control,
working memory, and processing speed. Systematic increases in inhibition demands
resulted in performance declines for both young and older adults; however, older adults
were disproportionately worse than younger adults on tasks with higher inhibition control
demands.
It should be noted that the association between theory of mind and working
memory and inhibition has been demonstrated in developmental and young adult
samples. Research suggests that during the preschool years inhibitory control (e.g.,
Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Hala, Hug, &
Henderson, 2003) and working memory (Mutter, Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006) critically
impacts theory of mind performance. Individual differences on theory of mind story
tasks in young adult samples also has been demonstrated to be driven, at least in part, by
working memory (Bull, Phillips, & Conway, 2008; Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight,
1998). For instance, Lin, Keysar, and Epley (2010) found that adults with low working
memory capacity were significantly worse at making mental state attributions than adults
with high working memory capacity. These results suggest that working memory is an
important executive capacity for explicit theory of mind performance in development as
well as through older adulthood. However, the current study did not examine young
adults performance and did not examine executive components beyond working memory
thus, these two issues cannot be directly assessed in the current study.
Collectively, an examination of the literature to date as well as the results from
the current study suggest that although working memory does mediate theory of mind
performance in older adults, there are other factors that contribute to individual
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differences in theory of mind during aging. It is possible that some of the studies did not
find evidence of working memory contributing to older adults theory of mind
performance because only a small amount of variance is explained by working memory.
Most the studies have used small sample sizes (e.g., n = 24 older adults, Sullivan &
Ruffman, 2004), which reduce the power to detect a small effect of working memory on
theory of mind performance. Furthermore, many of the studies have used a small number
of items to measure theory of mind performance in older adults (e.g., German & Hehman,
2006; Maylor et al., 2002). The current study addressed these issues by including a
sample size of 42 older adult participants and 20 items from the strange stories task (i.e.,
10 items for the theory of mind stories and 10 items for the control stories).
Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking
and Working Memory
H6

Spatial working memory will make a stronger contribution to performance
on a level-1 visual perspective taking task compared verbal working
memory.
Participants completed the level-1 visual perspective taking task alone and as a

dual task. Accordingly, two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted that
examined the role of working memory on each of the outcome variables (i.e., processing
costs for the alone task and processing costs for the dual task). Both hierarchical
regression analyses indicated that neither spatial nor verbal working memory contributed
to the model significantly. Thus, the current study did not find evidence of the role of
working memory on level-1 visual perspective taking performance.
No previous studies have examined the contribution of working memory on level1 visual perspective taking task developed by Samson et al. (2010). I predicted that
spatial working memory would explain level-1 visual perspective taking above verbal
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working memory based on an informal assessment of the task demands. To complete the
task, participants must keep in mind two pieces of information. That is, participants must
remember the perspective (i.e., self or other) and then the number (i.e., 0, 1, 2, or 3)
indicated on the computer screen to be able to give an accurate response. Moreover,
these two stimuli are presented for only 750 ms and participants cannot go back to view
these stimuli once they have been presented. In addition, since the task is visual and
includes a spatial component regarding the location of the red dots on the walls, I
examined the role of both spatial and verbal working memory on performance. In the
current study, symbol span was used to measure spatial working memory since it assesses
both the storage and manipulation of visual stimuli. In consideration of the requirements
of the task, I predicted that spatial working memory would explain level-1 visual
perspective taking above verbal working memory. Additionally, when considering that
two stimuli are presented successively and participants are required to subsequently use
that information to make a response, I was also interested in examining if verbal working
memory would make a contribution to the model. The current study, however, does not
indicate that spatial or verbal working memory contributes to level-1 visual perspective
taking in older adults.
These results strengthen the utility of using this task as a measure of automatic
perspective taking. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the specific feature that is
assumed to measure automatic processing is a contrast between consistent and
inconsistent trials for self perspective conditions. Rather than measuring automatic
processes directly, an automatic mechanism is inferred by examining the relative
difference between consistent and inconsistent trials. As a result, even if working
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memory did contribute to individual differences on level-1 visual perspective taking, the
automatic component of the task would still be compelling if an altercentric effect was
found.
In comparing the task demands of level-1 visual perspective taking with theory of
mind stories, it is not surprising that these two tasks do not involve the same working
memory demands. Still, prior to the current study, the working memory demands of
level-1 visual perspective taking had not been explored. The results from the current
study indicated that level-1 visual perspective taking did not load on working memory
while theory of mind performance did; this illustrates the usefulness of these tasks as
tapping different components of mental state understanding. Specifically, the
disassociation between these two tasks strengthens the case for conceptualizing level-1
visual perspective taking as containing relatively more implicit processes compared to the
theory of mind task, which involves relatively more explicit processes.
Limitations
The current study has several limitations that should be considered when
interpreting the results. First, even though an aging in place sample was obtained with
the goal of increasing the generalizability of the results, purposeful non-probability
sampling methods were used. Therefore, there are limits of the generalizability of the
sample to the wider population of older adults. Examining the demographics of the
current sample gives another indication that the results may not generalize to the broader
population. For example, the careers reported by the participants include engineers,
college faculty, computer programmers, and a physician (Appendix D). In addition, as
indicated by self-report, the sample was highly educated. It is plausible that the
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intelligence of the current sample was skewed to the right hand tail of the normal
distribution (i.e., negative skew); however, no measure of intelligence was obtained thus,
intellectual ability was not controlled for in the current study. In addition, the sample
was not screened for mild cognitive impairment; therefore, it is unknown if the sample in
the current study contained individuals who have symptoms of mild cognitive
impairment.
In regards to the level-visual perspective taking task, three limitations come to
mind. First, since no young adult sample was obtained in the current study caution is
needed when making inferences regarding age-related performance. All discussions
regarding contrasting age differences have been made based on three prior studies and
thus no direct contrast is available in the current study. Second, it is possible that the
dual task was not sufficiently difficult for the older adult sample. Interestingly, the
participants verbalized how challenging they felt the task was; however, when examining
the alone compared to the dual task conditions, little evidence is present that the dual task
adequately increased cognitive load. Even though the secondary task employed in the
current study was designed to tap inhibition control, there is the possibility that it was not
as difficult as the dual task used by Qureshi et al. (2010) or requires different underlying
mechanisms. The secondary task used by Qureshi et al. (2010) required that participants
tapped a box in the opposite direction of the number of tones that they heard. That is,
participants tapped once if they heard two tones and vice versa. It is possible that the
number of disks presented in the primary task and the number of tones presented in the
secondary task was a confound that increased the working memory load in addition to the
inhibitory demands during the dual task. In the current study, the confounding variable
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regarding the numerical aspect of the stimuli in the primary and secondary tasks was
removed; thus, the dual task employed in the current study cannot be directly compared
to the dual task used by Qureshi et al. Third, the secondary task in the current study may
not tap the same inhibitory processes that are involved in the perspective taking task.
In terms of the hierarchical regression results, two limitations should be
considered when interpreting the results. First, the range of variance in the criterion and
predictor variables were relatively low. The theory of mind story task had a mean of
15.48 (out of a 20 points possible) with a standard deviation of 2.54; however, there were
three outliers with low scores that were disconnected from the rest of the distribution.
The mean and standard deviation of the theory of mind story task with these three outliers
dropped are 16.03 and 1.75, indicating that the variance for the majority of the
distribution was small. Secondly, the older adults in the current sample performed more
typical of a young adult sample on the working memory measures. As discussed in
chapter two of the current study, older adults typically have wider variability compared to
young adults; however, the currents sample did not display this pattern. If the current
sample is more homogenous compared to the population (i.e., low amount of variance for
the current sample is an artifact of the current study) then it is possible that there was
reduced statistical power to detect the role of working memory on the level-1 perspective
taking task. That is, the low amount of variance for the current sample could have
limited the statistical power to detect associations between variables.
Future Research
With the goal of examining age-related differences in mental state understanding,
it would be important to compare the results from the current study to a young adult
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sample. Thus, the first recommendation for future research is to employ the same method
used in the current study with a young adult sample. In this way, an age comparison can
be made for both the level-1 visual perspective taking and the theory of mind story task.
In obtaining a young adult sample, the first question would be to examine if
young adults display egocentric and altercentric interference effects using the level-1
visual perspective taking task as reported in previous research (Samson et al.,2010;
Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010). Although there is no reason to believe
that the findings would differ from the previous three studies using young adult samples,
it would be valuable to obtain data from a young adult sample for a direct comparison. If
results from a younger adult sample mimic that of the previous studies conducted by
Apperly and colleagues, then this would provide further evidence that automatic
processes decline with age.
With the addition of a young adult sample, it would be interesting to examine if
older adults demonstrate larger egocentric interference compared to young adults.
Previous research suggests that older adults are more prone compared to young adults to
egocentric errors (Inagaki et al., 2002). Egocentric interference in the level-1 visual
perspective taking task is indicated by larger processing costs for inconsistent compared
to consistent trials when judging the other perspective. Currently, it is unknown if agerelated changes in egocentric interference would be demonstrated on the level-1 visual
perspective taking task. Finally, with a young adult sample, I recommend comparing
older adult performance to young adult performance on the day night task. German and
Hehman (2006) found that older adults did not perform significantly worse compared
young adults in a version of a day night task. Using an inhibition task that does not
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demonstrate age-related decline would be ideal in terms of controlling for the difficulty
of the secondary task for both groups.
The next recommendation for future research is to further investigate gender
differences on the level-1 visual perspective taking task. The current study found that
males were significantly faster compared to females as indicated by an overall gender
effect. No significant gender interactions were found; however, when including gender
as a between factor variable, and considering the number of conditions in the ANOVA
(i.e., 2 x 2 x 2 x 2), the sample size in the current study is low. A power analysis was
conducted for a mixed design (i.e., using within-subjects and between-subjects variables)
using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). With a medium
effect size (ηp2 = .3), alpha set to .05, power set to .95, and the correlation between
repeated measures set to .7, a sample size of 52 (26 males and 26 females) would be
necessary. Therefore, an additional 10 more participants should be collected to
adequately examine gender interactions.
In terms of examining gender, an interesting trend was found for the interaction
between perspective (i.e., self versus other) and consistency (i.e., consistent versus
inconsistent). There was a tendency for females but not males to be slower for the
inconsistent compared to the consistent trials for the Self perspective (i.e., females but not
males trended towards an altercentric interference effect). In contrast, both males and
females were significantly slower for the inconsistent compared to the consistent trials for
the Other perspective (i.e., demonstrating an egocentric interference effect). Even though
no significant gender interactions were present in the current study, females demonstrated
a 113 ms advantage in the consistent compared to inconsistent trials for the Self
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perspective; wheresas, males did not show any difference between inconsistent and
consistent trials for the Self perspective. It should be reemphasized that this gender
interaction was not statistically significant, which indicates that although females were
numerically slower for inconsistent compared to consistent trials, females did not
demonstrate a significant altercentric interference effect. The previous three studies that
used this task (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010) did
not report gender results, therefore it is unclear whether no gender differences were found
in the prior studies or if the researches did not examine gender (See Figures 9 and 10 for
an illustration of this gender trend).
It is interesting to consider the possibility that females may be prone to
altercentric interference effects while males may not be. This finding would be
consistent with research that has found gender differences in other areas of social
cognition. For instance, previous research suggest that females demonstrate enhanced
eye gaze cueing effects (Bayliss, Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2005), are more accurate in face
emotion recognition (Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue, 2010) and reading
nonverbal behavior (Hall, 1978), and are more sensitive to gleaning information from
eyes (Kirkland, Peterson, Baker, Miller, & Pulos, 2013) compared to males. Thus, it
would be noteworthy to examine this three-way interaction (i.e., perspective by
consistency by gender) with a larger sample size.
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Figure. 9. Line Graph of the Perspective by Consistency Interaction for Males.
Notes: This illustrates a signfiant consistency effect for the Other but not Self
perspective, which corresponds to an egocentric but not an altercentric interference
effect.
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Figure. 10. Line Graph of the Perspective by Consistency Interaction for Females.
Notes: This illustrates the signfiant consistency effect for Other perspective and a trend
towards a consistency effect for Self perspective. This corresponds to an egocentric effect
and a trend towards an altercentric interferene effect; however, the latter was not
significant.
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The final recommendation for future research is to replicate the current study
using a different sample of older adults. In the current study, the lack of evidence of
older adults automatically processing other people’s perspectives will only be
substantiated if theses findings are replicated. Furthermore, if the findings do replicate,
then it would be advised to investigate possible explanations regarding the mechanisms
of such age-related changes. That is, if future evidence supports differential automatic
processes related to mental state understanding in young compared to older adults, then
the sources of age-related change should be investigated.
Apperly proposed that examining the limits of the cognitive efficient system is
essential to understanding the dual route model of mental state understanding. Earlier I
suggested that speed of processing might be a possible limit of the cognitively efficient
system. Although I presented an argument that the lack of evidence of automatic
processes in older adults might be due to a processing speed limit, this hypothesis
requires further investigation. One recommendation is to collect processing speed data
and run a hierarchical regression with processing speed as a predictor variable and level-1
visual perspective taking as the outcome variable.
Apperly (2011) has suggested that the role of working memory and inhibition
may disproportionally impact older adults performance on explicit theory of mind tasks
(e.g., German & Hehman, 2006; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). In the current study,
verbal working memory made a statistically significant contribution to explaining theory
of mind performance, as measured by the Strange Stories Task, however, a large degree
of variance remained unaccounted for. Previous research suggests that other executive
processes are related to theory of mind performance, such as inhibition control (Charlton
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et al., 2009; Duval et al., 2011) and processing speed (German & Hehman, 2006). In the
current study, measures of inhibition control and processing speed were not obtained;
thus, these executive processes could not be examined. It would be useful to conduct two
hierarchical regressions with measures of inhibition control and speed of processing as
the predictor variables and both the level-1 visual perspective taking and theory of mind
story tasks as the outcome variables. Reaction time data from the Day-Night task that
was employed for the current study (i.e., the secondary task that was used for the dual
task level-1 visual perspective taking task) would be easy to obtain as a measure of
inhibition. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare the variance explained by
inhibition in young and older adult samples. Based on the robust evidence of age-related
decline in inhibitory control, I would hypothesize that individual differences on the DayNight task would mediate performance on the level-1 visual perspective taking task to a
larger degree in an older adults compared to a young adults. In addition, since the current
study was the first to examine the association of working memory on level-1 visual
perspective taking, it would be useful to replicate the hierarchical regression analysis
using the same tasks that were conducted in the current study as well as to include
additional working memory measures.
Conclusions
The current study examined mental state understanding in an aging sample from a
cognitive perspective. Previous research suggests that children and adults spontaneously
process other individual’s perspectives (Samson et al., 2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012;
Qureshi et al., 2010). Additionally, a significant amount of research also suggests that
some aspects of mental state understanding involve explicitly mediated processes (e.g.,
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Dunn & Brophy, 2005; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). For instance, researchers
have reported individual differences in mental state understanding are related to working
memory (e.g., Lin et al., 2010) and executive functioning (e.g., Sabbagh et al., 2006).
Aging is associated with cognitive decline in three areas that are also linked to explicit
mental state understanding: processing speed, executive functioning, and working
memory (Charlton et al., 2009). Therefore, when investigating mental state
understanding during the aging process, the cognitive resources that are associated with
mental state understanding must be taken into consideration (Moran, 2013). The primary
goal of the current study was to examine cognitively efficient and cognitively effortful
processes involved in mental state understanding during aging.
Two tasks were used to investigate mental state understanding in older adults,
which differ in the degree to which they involve implicit versus explicit processes. At a
basic level, mental state understanding involves perceptual processing of another
individual’s visual perspective (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981). A level-1 visual
perspective taking task was used to investigate if older adults demonstrate evidence of
taking another individuals perspective relatively automatically. To examine if taking
another individuals perspective is cognitive efficient, a dual task version of the level-1
visual perspective taking task was used. A theory of mind story task measured explicit
mental state understanding in older adults. Finally, a hierarchical regression was
conducted to examine the contribution of spatial and verbal working memory on both the
level-1 visual perspective taking and theory of mind story tasks.
The current study, failed to find evidence that older adults automatically take
another agent’s perspective using a level-1 visual perspective taking task. In contrast,
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the evidence in the current study suggests that processing a perspective that differs from
one’s own perspective is cognitively effortful. These findings were based on the
evidence that older adults suffered from egocentric but not altercentric interference
effects. Evidence from three previous studies demonstrated that taking the visual
perspective of another individual involves relatively automatic processes (Samson et al.,
2010; Surtees & Apperly, 2012; Qureshi et al., 2010). Three possible explanations were
presented regarding the lack of evidence of older adults automatically processing
another individual’s visual perspective.
One possible explanation regarding the lack of evidence in the current study of
automatic processes in level-1 visual perspective taking is that cognitive efficient
processes may decline during aging. While there is a substantial amount of evidence
that suggests explicit mental state understanding does decline with age, there is no a
priori reason to believe that relatively implicit mental state understanding would be
impervious to decline. Hence, the evidence from the current study does not necessarily
diverge from the larger literature suggesting a dissociable system for understanding
other’s mental states. Certainly, if older adults showed evidence of intact automatic and
cognitively efficient system, then this would provide evidence in support of the dual
route model in terms of a double disassociation. However, the evidence that the fast and
automatic system may decline with age does not inevitably threaten the theoretical
assumptions of the dual route for mental state understanding.
Gender was examined in the level-1 visual perspective taking task. Results
indicated that males performed significantly faster than females and no significant gender
interactions were found; however, there was a trend for females but not males to be prone
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to altercentric interference effects. I suggested that future research further examine
possible gender interactions on this task. The overall faster reaction times for males
compared to females aligns with the broader literature, which suggests that across the
adult lifespan that males respond significantly faster on reaction time measures compared
to females (e.g., Adam et al., 1999; Der & Deary, 2006).
With the burgeoning field of social cognitive science and the recognition that
mental state understanding is central to social communication, researchers have
investigated mental state understanding in a wide range of contexts and populations (Saxe
& Baron-Cohen, 2006). One corner of this research has examined mental state
understanding during the aging process. To date, an accumulation of research suggests
that mental state understanding deteriorates during normal aging (Henry et al., 2012;
Moran, 2013); however, the mechanism underlying the age-related decline is unclear.
The current study was the first to examine both cognitively efficient and cognitively
effortful processes in an older adult sample. No evidence was found of cognitively
efficient processes relating to level-1 visual perspective taking in the current study. In
addition, the current study examined if individual differences in working memory
contributes to theory of mind and level-1 visual perspective taking performance. Results
indicated that a small portion of theory of mind variance was explained by verbal but not
spatial working memory. Neither verbal nor spatial working memory contributed to
level-1 visual perspective taking performance. When considering the literature to date, it
seems the degree to which automatic versus effortful mechanisms are involved depends
on the specific context that mental state understanding is employed. In terms of mental
state understanding during aging, the current study provides no evidence that older adults
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automatically process another agent’s perspective. However, further research is
necessary before any conclusions can be made. In addition, since verbal working
memory only explained a small degree of variance in the theory of mind story task, future
research is recommended to investigate the impact of other executive processes that may
contribute to explicit mental state understanding during the aging process.
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CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO
Project Title:
Researcher:
Advisor:
Phone:

Mental State Understanding in Older Adults
Rena Kirkland, Educational Psychology Ph.D. Student
E-mail: Thom6071@bears.unco.edu
Marilyn Welsh, Ph.D., Psychological Sciences
(970) 351-2263
E-mail:
Marilyn.Welsh@unco.edu

Purpose and Description: The primary purpose of this study is to explore social
cognitive processes in older adults. Social cognition includes a wide range of
mental processes related to social interactions. For example, how we think about
other people, judge other people’s emotions and perspectives, and interpret
social interactions are various aspects of social cognition. In the current study,
we are interested in examining two different aspects of social cognition. We are
also interested in how general cognitive ability, such as performance on a
vocabulary test, is related to social cognition.
Participating in this study will consist of completing the following tasks:
• Responding either “yes” or “no” to a computerized task asking about how
many dots either you can see or the “cartoon” person can see
• Responding with a press to a computer mouse after a voice says “day” or
“night”
• Reading short stories about the interaction of two people and answer
questions regarding the intentions of the characters in the stories
• Examining photographs of eyes and choosing one word (from of four
possible words) that best describes the associated set of eyes
• Verbally responding to a list of numbers repeated exactly, repeated
backwards, and repeated in ascending order
• Examining pictures of shapes and then identifying the correct shapes that
were previously viewed in the correct order
A 10-dollar gift certificate will be offered to you as a token of our appreciation for
participating in this study. It is estimated that the data collection described above
will take 90 minutes to complete; however, you are free to stop this study before
the completion of the tasks. That is, you are free to withdraw from the study for
any reason at any time.
Page 1 of 2 _____ (please initial)
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Every precaution will be taken to protect confidentiality. A participant number will
be assigned to you. The only identifying information is this consent form, which
will be filed separately from the data. That is, your participant number will not be
connected to your name on this consent form. Data collected and analyzed for
this study will be kept in a locked cabinet in the College of Psychological
Sciences at the University of Northern Colorado.
Potential risks in this project are minimal. It is possible that some of the cognitive
tests will be perceived as stressful. In addition, you will be taking time out of your
daily life to participate in this study. As a small token of appreciation, a 10-dollar
gift certificate will be offered to you even if you decide to not complete the study.
It is important that you feel comfortable regarding the purpose of this study and
what participation involves. Please take this opportunity to ask the researcher
any questions you have regarding any aspects of this study.
Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and if
you begin participation you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time.
Your decision will be respected and will not result in loss of benefits to which you
are otherwise entitled. Having read the above and having had an opportunity to
ask any questions, please sign below if you would like to participate in this
research. A copy of this form will be given to you to retain for future reference. If
you have any concerns about your selection or treatment as a research
participant, please contact the Office of Sponsored Programs, Kepner Hall,
University of Northern Colorado Greeley, CO 80639; 970-351-2161.

Subject’s Signature

Researcher’s Signature

Date
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Please note that University of Northern Colorado (UNCO) IRB has
published the following Board Document on IRBNet:
Project Title: [474154-3] Mental State Understanding in Older Adults
Principal Investigator: Rena Kirkland
Submission Type: Amendment/Modification
Date Submitted: July 16, 2013
Document Type: Approval Letter
Document Description: Approval Letter
Publish Date: July 17, 2013
Should you have any questions you may contact Megan Babkes Stellino at
megan.stellino@unco.edu.
Thank you,
The IRBNet Support Team
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Table 13
Demographic Characteristics of Sample as Measured by Self-Report
Frequencies Percentag
e
Martial Status
Never
Divorced
Widowed
Living with significant other

2
1
5
33

4.8 %
2.4 %
11.9 %
78.6 %

No
Yes

9
31

22.5 %
77.5 %

Never
Seldom
Sometimes
Often

6
6
11
18

14.3 %
14.3 %
26.2 %
42.9 %

Poor
Fair
Good
Excellent

0
3
16
20

0
7.7
41.0
51.3

Poor
Fair
Good
Excellent

1
6
17
16

2.5
15.0
42.5
40.0

No
Yes

32
9

78.0
22.0

No
Yes

38
3

92.7
7.3

No
Yes

29
12

70.7
29.3

No
Yes

35
7

83.3
16.7

Retired
Exercise

Health

Computers

Part-time
work
Full-time
work
Volunteer
Homemaker
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Table 14
Careers of the Sample

Careers of participants
Certified public accountant
College professor
Computer programmer
Consulting
Business professor
Electrical engineer
Elementary school teacher
Estimator of awnings
Faculty in computer engineering
Fitness monitor
Foreign policy
Golf course ranger
Hairdresser & Nurse
Personal fitness trainer
Physical therapist
Physician
Real estate appraisals
Seamstress
Software development
Transcription business for law firm
Writer/musician
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Demographics
1.

Gender: ☐ Male ☐ Female

2.

Age: ___________

3.

As of today, what is your current marital status? Pick one of the following:
☐ Never married or partnered
☐ Divorced
☐ Widowed
☐ Living or married with significant other

4.

Over the past seven days, how often did you engage in
sport and/or recreational activities such as jogging, cycling, swimming, singles
tennis, aerobic dance, skiing, or other similar activities? Pick one of the
following:
☐ Never
☐ Seldom (1-2 days)
☐ Sometimes (3-4 days)
☐ Often (5-7 days)

5.

How would you rate your perceived health? Pick one of
☐ Poor
☐ Fair
☐ Good
☐ Excellent

6.

How would you rate your comfort level with computers?
☐ Poor
☐ Fair
☐ Good
☐ Excellent

the following:
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7.

How many years of education do you have, including any college? _________

8.

Occupation: (check all that apply)
☐ Currently retired
If yes, since what year _________
☐ Full-time homemaker
☐ Volunteer
☐ Employed full-time**
☐ Employed part-time**
** If you are currently employed full or part-time, what kind of work do you do?
______________________________________________________________
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F_version (right-handed)
Thank you for participating in this study!
You will see a room with a woman inside.
On the left and right walls, there are sometimes red circles pinned on the wall.
Here is an example:

On half of the trials, you will respond to how many circles you can see from your
perspective.
On the other half of the trials, you will respond to how many circles the woman can see
from her perspective.
During the experiment you will see the following sequence of events:
1) a plus sign
2) the words YOU or SHE
3) a number between 0 and 3
4) the picture of the room  This is where you will make a “yes” or “no” response
• Answer yes, when the number of circles matches the perspective you were
told to take (i.e., YOU or SHE)
• Answer no, when the number of circles does not match the perspective you
were told to take (i.e., YOU or SHE)
5) After your response, you will be given a feedback (“Correct” or “Wrong”)
It is important that you try to respond as quickly and accurately as possible.
We will start with a practice block. Then, there will be 2 test blocks and one more
practice block. In between the blocks, you can take a break.
As a reminder, try to respond as quickly and accurately as possible.
Thanks again for your participation!
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Here are two examples

+

+

YOU

SHE

1

Index

YES

1

Middle finger

NO

S

Correct

Correct

Figure. 5. Participants Viewed the Following Image Accompanied Verbal Instructions
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Table 15
Distribution Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Processing Costs without
Transformations
Shapiro-Wilk
Skewness
Kurtosis
n Statistic Sig.
Statistic
SE Statistic
SE
Alone
Other Consistent

40

.901

.002

.928

.369

.037

.724

Other Inconsistent

40

.741

.000

2.448

.369

6.480

.724

Self Consistent

40

.890

.001

1.255

.369

1.739

.724

Self Inconsistent

40

.798

.000

1.810

.369

3.380

.724

Other Consistent

40

.731

.000

1.726

.374

3.136

.733

Other Inconsistent

40

.824

.000

2.238

.369

5.936

.724

Self Consistent

40

.756

.000

2.894

.369

10.239

.724

Self Inconsistent

40

.810

.000

2.542

.369

6.904

.724

Dual

Note. SE = Standard Error; Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis should be < ± 3
Table 16
Distribution Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Processing Costs after
Transformations
Shapiro-Wilk
Skewness
Kurtosis
n Statistic Sig.
Statistic
SE Statistic
SE
Alone
Other Consistent

40

.948

.058

.557

.369

-.522

.724

Other Inconsistent

40

.902

.002

1.166

.369

1.674

.724

Self Consistent

40

.964

.222

.583

.369

-.039

.724

Self Inconsistent

40

.920

.007

.979

.369

.455

.724

Other Consistent

40

.935

.021

1.075

.369

1.566

.724

Other Inconsistent

40

.952

.086

.464

.374

1.141

.733

Self Consistent

40

.937

.025

1.001

.369

1.458

.724

Self Inconsistent

40

.911

.004

1.290

.369

2.436

.724

Dual

Note. SE = Standard Error; Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis should be < ± 3
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Table 17
Distribution Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Reaction Time without
Winsorizing
Shapiro-Wilk
Skewness
Kurtosis
n Statistic Sig.
Statistic
SE Statistic
SE
Alone
Other Consistent

40

.901

.002

.93

.37

.04

.72

Other Inconsistent

40

.741

.000

2.45

.37

6.48

.72

Self Consistent

40

.890

.001

1.26

.37

1.74

.72

Self Inconsistent

40

.798

.000

1.81

.37

3.38

.72

Other Consistent

40

.731

.000

2.55

.37

8.62

.72

Other Inconsistent

40

.824

.000

1.73

.37

3.14

.73

Self Consistent

40

.756

.000

2.24

.37

5.94

.72

Self Inconsistent

40

.810

.000

2.89

.37

10.24

.72

Dual

Note. SE = Standard Error; Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis should be < ± 3
Table 18
Distribution Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Reaction Time after
Winsorizing
Shapiro-Wilk
Skewness
Kurtosis
n Statistic Sig.
Statistic
SE Statistic
SE
Alone
Other Consistent

40

.950

.073

.560

.369

-.188

.724

Other Inconsistent

40

.944

.046

.566

.369

.575

.724

Self Consistent

40

.958

.148

.398

.369

-.619

.724

Self Inconsistent

40

.925

.012

.733

.369

-.339

.724

Other Consistent

40

.907

.003

.978

.369

.473

.724

Other Inconsistent

40

.957

.136

.660

.374

.909

.733

Self Consistent

40

.907

.003

.957

.369

.114

.724

Self Inconsistent

40

.964

.232

.398

.369

-.669

.724

Dual

Note. SE = Standard Error; Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis should be < ± 3
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APPENDIX H
DISTRIBTUTION STATISTICS FOR THEORY OF MIND
AND WORKING MEMORY MEASURES
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Table 19
Distribution Statistics for Theory of Mind Story Task, Verbal and Spatial Working
Memory
Shapiro-Wilk
Skewness
Kurtosis
n Statistic Sig.
Statistic
SE Statistic
SE
SST
Theory of mind

42

.896

.001

-1.110

.365

2.104

.717

Control stories

42

.938

.024

-.427

.365

-.602

.717

42

.964

.213

.461

.365

.437

.717

Digit span forward

42

.962

.171

.436

.365

-.327

.717

Digit span backward

42

.892

.001

1.166

.365

2.296

.717

Digit span sequence

42

.958

.127

-.155

.365

-.527

.717

42

.986

.883

-.102

.365

-.359

.717

Digit span total

Symbol span

Note. SST = Strange stories Task, which includes theory of mind stories and control
stories (Happé, 1994); SE = standard error; Digit span is a measure of verbal working
memory and symbol span is a measure of visual working memory from the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (Wechsler, 2008); Skewness should be < ± 2; Kurtosis
should be < ± 3
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APPENDIX I
STATISTICS FOR LEVENE’S TEST OF EQUAL ERROR
VARIANCES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
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Table 20
Levene’s Test for Equality of Variance for the Mixed-design ANOVA
Condition

F-test

p-value

Other consistent

.572

.454

Other inconsistent

.155

.696

Self consistent

.421

.520

Self inconsistent

8.023

.007

Other consistent

1.803

.187

Other inconsistent

.004

.952

Self consistent

.233

.632

Self inconsistent

3.742

.061

Alone

Dual

Note. Levene’s test is not considered a threat to equal variance unless the p-value is
< .001; thus, all variables meet the assumption of homogeneity of variance.
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APPENDIX J
DESCRIPTIVE STASTICS FOR LEVEL-1 VISUAL
PERSPECTIVE TAKING TASK: PROCESSING
COSTS WITH THE NATURAL LOG
TRANSFORMATION
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Table 21
Descriptive Statistics for Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: Processing Costs with
Natural Log Transformations
N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Other Consistent

40

6.8382

.21753

6.49

7.35

Other Inconsistent

40

7.1353

.37616

6.42

8.34

Self Consistent

40

6.8472

.26486

6.41

7.54

Self Inconsistent

40

6.9468

.36600

6.47

7.94

Other Consistent

40

6.8925

.36914

6.31

8.11

Other Inconsistent

40

7.1461

.37489

6.18

8.05

Self Consistent

40

6.9983

.33442

6.46

8.07

Self Inconsistent

40

7.0763

.33737

6.50

8.07

Alone

Dual
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APPENDIX K
DESCRIPTIVE STATISICS FOR LEVEL-1 VISUAL
PERSPECTIVE TAKING TASK: REACTION
TIME BEFORE DATA WERE
WINSORIZED
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Table 22
Descriptive Statistics for L-1 VP Task: Reaction Time before Data were Winsorized

N

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Other Consistent

40

898.20

209.83

587.00

1553.00

Other Inconsistent

40

1111.60

304.35

497.00

2033.00

Self Consistent

40

940.48

267.06

490.00

1882.00

Self Inconsistent

40

978.58

318.79

471.00

1826.00

Other Consistent

40

970.35

354.47

548.00

2380.00

Other Inconsistent

40

1094.65

311.15

483.00

2093.00

Self Consistent

40

1064.15

340.47

639.00

2217.00

Self Inconsistent

40

1068.28

253.86

664.00

1637.00

Alone

Dual

Note. L-1 VP = level-1 visual perspective taking

